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Demand properties in household Nash equilibrium

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Author Info
Valérie Lechene (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College London)
Ian Preston () (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College London)

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Abstract

Please Note: This paper was updated in July 2007

We study noncooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods, deriving the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true Slutsky matrix in the unitary model. We demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between cases in which there are and are not jointly contributed public goods and provide results characterising both cases. Demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model against noncooperative alternatives.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Fiscal Studies in its series IFS Working Papers with number W07/01.

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Length: 33 pp.
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:07/01

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Valerie Lechene & Ian Preston, 2005. "Household Nash Equilibrium with Voluntarily Contributed Public Goods," Economics Series Working Papers 226, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1990. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Reply," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(1), pages 237-42, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Eduardo Ley, 1996. "On the private provision of public goods: a diagrammatic exposition," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(1), pages 105-123, January. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alistair Munro, 2009. "Introduction to the Special Issue: Things We Do and Don’t Understand About the Household and the Environment," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 43(1), pages 1-10, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Laurens Cherchye & Bram De Rock & Frederic Vermeulen, 2008. "The Revealed Preference Approach to Collective Consumption Behavior: Testing, Recovery and Welfare Analysis," ECARES Working Papers 2008_029, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Ecares. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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