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Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores

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  • Alberto Alesina
  • Andrea Ichino
  • Loukas Karabarbounis

Abstract

Gender-based taxation (GBT ) satisfies Ramsey's rule because it taxes at a lower rate the more elastic labor supply of women. We study GBT in a model in which labor elasticities emerge endogenously from intrahousehold bargaining. We explore the cases of superior bargaining power for men, higher male wages, and higher female home productivity. In all cases, men commit to a career in the market, take less home duties than women, and have lower labor supply elasticity. When society resolves its distributional concerns efficiently with gender-specific lump sum transfers, GBT with higher marginal tax rates on (single and married) men is optimal. (JEL D13, H21, H24, J16, J22)

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Economic Policy.

Volume (Year): 3 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 1-40

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:3:y:2011:i:2:p:1-40

Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.3.2.1
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    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2009-02-21 03:09:00
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