Income splitting, specialization, and intra-family distribution
AbstractIncome splitting for tax purposes results in more specialization of wives, but does this in turn generate more gender inequality? In my dynamic bargaining model with a divorce threatpoint, I find that who controls the couple's labour supply plays a crucial role in establishing this link. If spouses choose their labour supply non-cooperatively, only the husband's increase - but not her own decrease - in labour supply introduces a negative term in the wife's change in welfare. If the wife does not control her own labour supply, a decrease in her own labour supply introduces an additional negative term.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 42 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
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- Volker Meier & Helmut Rainer, 2012. "Beyond Ramsey: Gender-Based Taxation with Non-Cooperative Couples," CESifo Working Paper Series 3966, CESifo Group Munich.
- Elisabeth Gugl & Justin Leroux, 2009.
"Share the Gain, Share the Pain? Almost Transferable Utility, Changes in Production Possibilities, and Bargaining Solutions,"
Cahiers de recherche
- Gugl, Elisabeth & Leroux, Justin, 2011. "Share the gain, share the pain? Almost transferable utility, changes in production possibilities, and bargaining solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 133-143.
- Elisabeth Gugl & Justin Leroux, 2009. "Share the Gain, Share the Pain? Almost Transferable Utility, changes in production possibilities, and bargaining solutions," Cahiers de recherche 09-05, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
- Elisabeth Gugl & Justin Leroux, 2009. "Share the Gain, Share the Pain? Almost Transferable Utility, Changes in Production Possibilities and Bargaining Solutions," Department Discussion Papers 0903, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
- Elisabeth Gugl, 2007. "Share the Gain, Share the Pain? Almost Transferable Utility, Changes in Production Possibilities, and Bargaining Solutions," Department Discussion Papers 0705, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
- Alexander Kemnitz & Marcel Thum, 2012. "Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3798, CESifo Group Munich.
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