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Optimal Commodity Taxation and Redistribution within Households

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  • Olivier Bargain

    (University College Dublin)

  • Olivier Donni

    (University of Cergy-Pontoise)

Abstract

Using a collective model of consumption, we characterize optimal commodity taxes aimed at targeting specific individuals within the household. The main message is that distortionary indirect taxation can circumvent the agency problem of the household. Essentially, taxation should discourage less the consumption of a certain group of goods - those for which the slope of the Engel curves is larger for the targeted person.

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File URL: http://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/WP11_07.pdf
File Function: First version, 2011
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by School Of Economics, University College Dublin in its series Working Papers with number 201107.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 28 Mar 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ucn:wpaper:201107

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Web page: http://www.ucd.ie/economics
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Keywords: optimal commodity taxation; targeting; intrahousehold distribution;

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  1. Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Arthur Lewbel, 2013. "Estimating Consumption Economies of Scale, Adult Equivalence Scales, and Household Bargaining Power," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1267-1303.
  2. Olivier Bargain & Olivier Donni, 2012. "Targeting and child poverty," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(4), pages 783-808, October.
  3. Brett, Craig, 1998. "Tax reform and collective family decision-making," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 425-440, December.
  4. Donni, Olivier, 2003. "Collective household labor supply: nonparticipation and income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1179-1198, May.
  5. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2006. "The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples," NBER Working Papers 12685, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Anyck Dauphin & Abdel-Rahmen El Lahga & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2010. "Are Children Decision-Makers Within the Household?," CIRANO Working Papers 2010s-17, CIRANO.
  7. Apps, Patricia & Rees, Ray, 1999. "On the taxation of trade within and between households," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 241-263, August.
  8. P. A. Diamond, 1975. "A Many-Person Ramsey Tax Rule," Working papers 146, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  9. Alessandro Balestrino, 2004. "Revisiting the Equity-Efficiency Trade-off: Taxation with Non-Cooperative Families," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 60(4), pages 515-, December.
  10. Olivier Donni, 2006. "Collective consumption and welfare," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(1), pages 124-144, February.
  11. Apps, Patricia F. & Rees, Ray, 1988. "Taxation and the household," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 355-369, April.
  12. Sam Allgood, 2009. "The Collective Household, Household Production and Efficiency of Marginal Reforms," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(5), pages 749-771, October.
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