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Tagging and Income Taxation: Theory and an Application

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  • Helmuth Cremer
  • Firouz Gahvari
  • Jean-Marie Lozachmeur

Abstract

We derive a set of analytical results for optimal income taxation with tags using quasilinear preferences and a Rawlsian social welfare function. Secondly, assuming a constant elasticity of labor supply and log-normality of the skills distribution, we analytically identify the winners and losers of tagging. Third, we prove that if the skills distribution in one group first-order stochastically dominates the other, tagging calls for redistribution from the former to the latter group. Finally, we calibrate our model to the US workers using gender as tag. Welfare implications are dramatic. Only male high-wage earners lose. Everyone else gains, some substantially. (JEL H21, H23, H24)

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Economic Policy.

Volume (Year): 2 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 31-50

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:2:y:2010:i:1:p:31-50

Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.2.1.31
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References

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  1. Viard, Alan D, 2001. " Optimal Categorical Transfer Payments: The Welfare Economics of Limited Lump-Sum Redistribution," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 483-500.
  2. Alan D. Viard, 2001. "Some Results on the Comparative Statics of Optimal Categorical Transfer Payments," Public Finance Review, , vol. 29(2), pages 148-180, March.
  3. Alberto Alesina & Andrea Ichino & Loukas Karabarbounis, 2007. "Gender Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores," NBER Working Papers 13638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Robin, BOADWAY & Laurence, JACQUET, 2006. "Optimal Marginal and Average Income Taxation under Maxi-min," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006020, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  5. N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew C. Weinzierl, 2009. "The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case Study of Utilitarian Income Redistribution," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-139, Harvard Business School.
  6. Stern, Nicholas, 1982. "Optimum taxation with errors in administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 181-211, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Ooghe, Erwin & Peichl, Andreas, 2014. "Fair and efficent taxation under partial control," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-002, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  2. Alesina, Alberto & Ichino, Andrea & Karabarbounis, Loukas, 2007. "Gender Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores," IZA Discussion Papers 3233, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Goulão, Catarina & Thibault, Emmanuel, 2013. "Physical Activity and Policy Recommendations: a Social Multiplier Approach," TSE Working Papers 13-414, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  4. Bastani, Spencer, 2012. "Gender-Based and Couple-Based Taxation," Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies 2012:6, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  5. Helmuth Cremer & Firouz Gahvari & Pierre Pestieau, 2012. "Accidental Bequests: A Curse for the Rich and a Boon for the Poor," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(4), pages 1437-1459, December.
  6. Ooghe, Erwin & Peichl, Andreas, 2010. "Fair and Efficient Taxation under Partial Control: Theory and Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 5388, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Findeisen, Sebastian & Sachs, Dominik, 2011. "Education and Optimal Dynamic Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 6056, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Laurence JACQUET & Etienne LEHMANN, 2014. "Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with Multidimensional Types: The Case with Heterogeneous Behavioral Responses," THEMA Working Papers 2014-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  9. Bastani, Spencer & Blomquist, Sören & Micheletto, Luca, 2010. "Public Provision of Private Goods, Tagging and Optimal Income Taxation with Heterogeneity in Needs," Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies 2010:14, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  10. Pierre Pestieau & Maria Racioenero, 2011. "Tagging with leisure needs," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2011-553, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
  11. Sebastian Findeisen & Dominik Sachs, 2011. "Education and optimal dynamic taxation: The role of income-contingent student loans," ECON - Working Papers 040, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Sep 2012.

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