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Tagging and Redistributive Taxation

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Author Info
Robin Boadway () (Queen's University)
Pierre Pestieau () (Universite de Liege)

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Abstract

We study the optimal redistributive tax structure when the population can be disaggregated into tagged groups. We begin with the case in which the tag has no normative significance, but simply separates the population into identifiable groups with different distributions of ability-types. Under reasonable circumstances, the tax system will be more redistributive in the tagged group with the higher proportion of high-ability persons. We then extend the analysis to the case where the tag reflects differences in needs, that is, differences in the resources required to achieve a given level of utility, for example, due to a medical condition or a disability. The amount of compensation given for needs depends on whether the income tax structure is differentiated by needs groups.

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File URL: http://www.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_1071.pdf
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File Function: First version 2006
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1071.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: May 2006
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Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:1071

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Related research
Keywords: optimal income tax tagging needs

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2004. "Public Good Provision and the Comparative Statics of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation," Working Papers 0415, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Jonathan Hamilton & Pierre Pestieau, 2005. "Optimal Income Taxation and the Ability Distribution: Implications for Migration Equilibria," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 29-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Robin Boadway & Manuel Leite-Monteiro & Maurice Marchand & Pierre Pestieau, 2002. "Social Insurance and Redistribution," Working Papers 1004, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1976. "The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 55-75. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Nicholas Rowe & Frances Woolley, 1999. "The Efficiency Case for Universality," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(3), pages 613-629, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1999. "Redistribution," Working Papers 983, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Boadway, Robin & Keen, Michael, 2000. "Redistribution," Handbook of Income Distribution, in: A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (ed.), Handbook of Income Distribution, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 677-789 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Robin Boadway, 2003. "The Theory and Practice of Equalization," Working Papers 1016, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Keen, Michael, 1992. "Needs and Targeting," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(410), pages 67-79, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Virginia Hernanz & Franck Malherbet & Michele Pellizzari, 2004. "Take-Up of Welfare Benefits in OECD Countries: A Review of the Evidence," OECD Social Employment and Migration Working Papers 17, OECD Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. [Downloadable!]
  11. Parsons, Donald O., 1996. "Imperfect 'tagging' in social insurance programs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 183-207, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Pollak, Robert A, 1971. "Additive Utility Functions and Linear Engel Curves," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(116), pages 401-14, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Guesnerie, Roger & Seade, Jesus, 1982. "Nonlinear pricing in a finite economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 157-179, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Immonen, Ritva, et al, 1998. "Tagging and Taxing: The Optimal Use of Categorical and Income Information in Designing Tax/Transfer Schemes," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(258), pages 179-92, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Cremer, H. & Pestieau, P. & Rochet, J.-C., 1999. "Direct Versus Indirect Taxation: the Design of the Tax Structure Revisited," Papers 9910, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
    Other versions:
  17. Laurence, JACQUET & Bruno, VAN DER LINDEN, 2003. "The Normative Analysis of ‘Tagging’ Revisited : Dealing with Stigmatization," Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Discussion Paper 2003030, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Diamond, Peter A, 1998. "Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 83-95, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Viard, Alan D, 2001. " Optimal Categorical Transfer Payments: The Welfare Economics of Limited Lump-Sum Redistribution," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 483-500. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Walter Bossert & John A. Weymark, . "Utility in Social Choice," Old UBC Departmental Papers 9623, UBC Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  21. Robin Boadway & Pierre Pestieau, 2002. "Indirect Taxation and Redistribution: The Scope of the Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem," Working Papers 1005, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  22. Blackorby, Charles & Donaldson, David, 1994. "Information and Intergroup Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 440-47, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2004. "Public Good Provision and the Comparative Statics of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation," Working Papers 0415, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Stuart Adam, 2005. "Measuring the marginal efficiency cost of redistribution in the UK," IFS Working Papers W05/14, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
  3. Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2005. "Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savings in a Two Class Economy," Working Papers 0525, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Craig Brett & John Weymark, 2007. "The Impact of Changing Skill Levels on Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes," Working Papers 0708, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
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