Public Good Provision and the Comparative Statics of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation
Abstract
Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs an income tax schedule for redistributive purposes and provides a public good optimally. There are two types of individuals, distinguished by their skill levels, who have the same quasilinear preferences for labour supply and the consumption of a private and a public good. The parameters for which comparative statics are obtained are the weights in a weighted utilitarian social welfare function, the prices of the private and public goods, a taste parameter that measures the onerousness of working, and the individual skill levels.Download Info
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 0415.Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0415
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html
Related research
Keywords: Optimal income taxation; public goods; comparative statics;Other versions of this item:
- Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2008. "Public Good Provision And The Comparative Statics Of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(1), pages 255-290, 02.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-12-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2004-12-12 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2004-12-12 (Public Finance)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jonathan Hamilton & Pierre Pestieau, 2005.
"Optimal Income Taxation and the Ability Distribution: Implications for Migration Equilibria,"
International Tax and Public Finance,
Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 29-45, January.
- HAMILTON, Jonathan & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2002. "Optimal income taxation and the ability distribution: implications for migration equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 2002036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff & Maurice Marchand, 1999.
"Optimal Income Taxation With Quasi-Linear Preferences Revisited,"
Working Papers
984, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Boadway, Robin & Cuff, Katherine & Marchand, Maurice, 2000. " Optimal Income Taxation with Quasi-linear Preferences Revisited," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(4), pages 435-60.
- Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
- J. A. Mirrlees, 1976.
"Optimal Tax Theory: A Synthesis,"
Working papers
176, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Mirrlees, J. A., 1976. "Optimal tax theory : A synthesis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 327-358, November.
- Robin BOADWAY & Pierre PESTIEAU, 2006.
"Tagging and redistributive taxation,"
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique,
ENSAE, issue 83-84, pages 123-147.
- Robin Boadway & Pierre Pestieau, 2006. "Tagging and Redistributive Taxation," Working Papers 1071, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Guesnerie, Roger & Seade, Jesus, 1982.
"Nonlinear pricing in a finite economy,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 157-179, March.
- Guesnerie Roger & Seade Jesus, 1981. "Nonlinear pricing in a finite economy," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8118, CEPREMAP.
- Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1991.
"Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation,"
Working Papers
828, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Boadway, Robin & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 463-78, August.
- Weymark, John A, 1987. "Comparative Static Properties of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1165-85, September.
- Roell, Ailsa A., 1985. "A note on the marginal tax rate in a finite economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 267-272, November.
- Myles,Gareth D., 1995. "Public Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521497695.
- Diamond, P., 1994.
"Optimal Income Taxation: An Exemple with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates,"
Working papers
94-14, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Diamond, Peter A, 1998. "Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 83-95, March.
- Lollivier, Stefan & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1983. "Bunching and second-order conditions: A note on optimal tax theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 392-400, December.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982.
"Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1982. "Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation," NBER Working Papers 0632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2010.
"How Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes Change When the Distribution of the Population Changes,"
Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers
1003, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2011. "How optimal nonlinear income taxes change when the distribution of the population changes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1239-1247.
- Rafael Aigner, 2011. "Environmental Taxation and Redistribution Concerns," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Brett, Craig, 2008.
"The effects of population aging on optimal redistributive taxes in an overlapping generations model,"
MPRA Paper
8585, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Craig Brett, 2012. "The effects of population aging on optimal redistributive taxes in an overlapping generations model," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 19(6), pages 777-799, December.
- Alan Krause, 2008. "Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with Learning-by-Doing," Discussion Papers 08/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Robin BOADWAY & Pierre PESTIEAU, 2006.
"Tagging and redistributive taxation,"
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique,
ENSAE, issue 83-84, pages 123-147.
- Robin Boadway & Pierre Pestieau, 2006. "Tagging and Redistributive Taxation," Working Papers 1071, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Craig Brett & John Weymark, 2008. "Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savings without Commitment," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0805, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Krause, Alan, 2009. "Optimal nonlinear income taxation with learning-by-doing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1098-1110, October.
- Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2005. "Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savings in a Two Class Economy," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0525, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2008.
"The impact of changing skill levels on optimal nonlinear income taxes,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1765-1771, July.
- Craig Brett & John Weymark, 2007. "The Impact of Changing Skill Levels on Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0708, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Leung, Tin Cheuk & Yazici, Hakki, 2011. "On the Optimal Skill Distribution in a Mirrleesian Economy," MPRA Paper 32596, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Lists
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0415For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

