This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Optimal Income Taxation and the Ability Distribution: Implications for Migration Equilibria

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jonathan Hamilton ()
Pierre Pestieau ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

As recently argued by Diamond (1998), one of the key factors explaining the progressivity of an optimal non-linear income tax is the distribution of productivity among workers. Migration is one source of changes in the productivity distribution. How changes in the population’s ability distribution affect optimal income tax schedules has received little attention. Changing the distribution generally affects both the objective function and the government budget constraint. We first consider the comparative statics of the fraction of highly-skilled workers with maximin and maximax welfare functions (so that only the second effect is present) and a quasi-linear utility function. We also present some results for a utilitarian social welfare function. We then study the interaction between mobility and redistributive taxation. We consider mobility by either the skilled or unskilled population under majority voting where governments take the population as fixed. If individuals choose to relocate independently, having identical ability distributions is always a stable equilibrium when the unskilled are the mobile group. However, this is not always the case when the skilled are mobile. If groups of individuals can choose where to locate, having identical ability distributions across regions is only an equilibrium when the mobile type has an overall majority. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10797-005-6391-3
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 12 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 29-45
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:12:y:2005:i:1:p:29-45

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: optimal income taxation; tax competition; migration;

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. David E. Wildasin, 1994. "Income Redistribution and Migration," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 637-56, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Epple, Dennis & Filimon, Radu & Romer, Thomas, 1984. "Equilibrium among local jurisdictions: toward an integrated treatment of voting and residential choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 281-308, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with interregional differences in factor endowments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 423-451, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jan K. Brueckner, 2000. "Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom: Theory and Evidence," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 505-525, January.
  5. Leite-Monteiro, Manuel, 1997. "Redistributive policy with labour mobility across countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 229-244, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Brueckner, Jan K. & Zenou, Yves, 1999. "Harris-Todaro models with a land market," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 317-339, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Wilson, John Douglas, 1992. "Optimal Income Taxation and International Personal Mobility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 191-96, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Weymark, John A, 1987. "Comparative Static Properties of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1165-85, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Hindriks, Jean, 2001. " Mobility and Redistributive Politics," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(1), pages 95-120. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2004. "Public Good Provision and the Comparative Statics of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation," Working Papers 0415, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Brett, Craig, 2008. "The effects of population aging on optimal redistributive taxes in an overlapping generations model," MPRA Paper 8585, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jon Hamilton & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Pierre Pestieau, 2002. "Rawlsian governments and the race to the bottom," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 8(2), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
  4. Robin Boadway & Pierre Pestieau, 2006. "Tagging and Redistributive Taxation," Working Papers 1071, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2005. "Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savings in a Two Class Economy," Working Papers 0525, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Gwenael Piaser, 2003. "Labor Mobility and Income Tax Competition," Public Economics 0302002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Laurent Simula, 2007. "Optimality conditions and comparative static properties of non-linear income taxes revisited," PSE Working Papers 2007-15, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  8. Craig Brett & John Weymark, 2007. "The Impact of Changing Skill Levels on Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes," Working Papers 0708, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All top Economics journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.