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Optimal income taxation with quasi-linear preferences revisited

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  • BOADWAY, Robin
  • CUFF, Katherine
  • MARCHAND, Maurice

Abstract

With quasi-linear in leisure preferences, closed-form solutions for the marginal tax rates and the marginal utility of consumption under utilitarian and maxi-min objectives depend only on the skill distribution. Bunching induced by binding second-order incentive conditions also depends only on the distribution, but does not affect solutions in the non-bunched range. These are affected if bunching is caused by binding non-negative income constraints. Specific skill distributions are considered and it shown that the pattern of marginal tax rates depend critically on whether or not the skill distribution is truncated at the upper end.
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Suggested Citation

  • BOADWAY, Robin & CUFF, Katherine & MARCHAND, Maurice, 2000. "Optimal income taxation with quasi-linear preferences revisited," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1466, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1466
    DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00045
    Note: In : Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2(4), 435-460, 2000
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    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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