Shall We Keep Highly Skilled at Home? The Optimal Income Tax Perspective
AbstractWe examine how allowing individuals to emigrate to pay lower taxes abroad changes the optimal non-linear income tax scheme in a Mirrleesian economy. An individual emigrates if his domestic utility is less than his utility abroad net of migration costs, utilities and costs both depending on productivity. Three average social criteria are distinguished – national, citizen and resident – according to the agents whose welfare matters. A curse of the middle-skilled occurs in the first-best and it may be optimal to let some highly skilled leave the country under the resident criterion. In the second-best, we provide an extension of Saez’s formula for the optimal marginal tax rates. The middle-skilled can support the highest average tax rates and the marginal tax rates can be negative. Preventing emigration of the highly skilled is not necessarily optimal under the citizen and resident criteria.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies with number 2009:9.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 12 Oct 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
More information through EDIRC
Optimal Income Tax; Emigration; Participation Constraints; Highly Skilled;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Vilen Lipatov & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2010.
"Optimal Income Taxation with Tax Competition,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
3108, CESifo Group Munich.
- Alain Trannoy, Laurent Simula and, 2009.
"Optimal Income Tax under the Threat of Migration by Top-Income Earners,"
Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies
2009:8, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Simula, Laurent & Trannoy, Alain, 2010. "Optimal income tax under the threat of migration by top-income earners," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 163-173, February.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Katarina Grönvall).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.