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Optimal income tax under the threat of migration by top-income earners

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  • Simula, Laurent
  • Trannoy, Alain

Abstract

We examine how allowing individuals to emigrate to pay lower taxes changes the optimal nonlinear income tax scheme in a Mirrleesian economy. An individual emigrates if his domestic utility is less than his utility abroad, net of migration costs -- utilities and costs both depending on productivity. A simple formula, that complements Saez's formula obtained in closed economy, is derived for the marginal tax rates faced by top-income earners. It depends on the labour elasticity, the tax rate abroad and the migration costs expressed as a fraction of the utility obtained abroad. The Rawlsian marginal tax rates, obtained for the whole population, illustrate a curse of the middle-skilled. Simulations are provided for the French economy.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 94 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (February)
Pages: 163-173

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:1-2:p:163-173

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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Keywords: Optimal income taxation Top-income Emigration Participation constraints;

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