The Balance of Brains: Corruption and High Skilled Migration
AbstractIn a mobile labor market, a high emigration rate of high skilled workers is not necessarily a problem, if counterbalanced by a high immigration rate. However, some countries experience a net gain of high skilled while others a net loss. Corruption is part of the explanation, acting through two different channels: first, it pushes skilled natives to virtuous countries, where they can find a job based on meritocratic criteria; second, it discourages the entry of foreign talents, which would hardly have access to string-pulling recommendations. This might induce a prolonged loss in human capital and vanish investments in education.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) with number 2013010.
Date of creation: 15 May 2013
Date of revision:
migration; high-skilled; corruption;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-HRM-2013-06-04 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIG-2013-06-04 (Economics of Human Migration)
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