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The Mirrlees Approach to the Theory of Economic Policy

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Robin Boadway ()

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Abstract

This paper summarizes James Mirrlees' key contribution to the theory of tax policy. It argues that the Mirrlees approach of viewing government as being constrained by imperfect information has changed profoundly how we look at the normative public policy. In this view, asymmetric information provides the limit to redistribution by restricting the efficiency-equity trade-off. It leads to consideration of other policy instruments for relaxing incentive constraints and improving the efficiency of redistributive policies. Some of these instruments include quantity controls, in-kind transfers and public provision or mandating of insurance, things we observe in practice. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1008668509373
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 5 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 67-81
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Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:5:y:1998:i:1:p:67-81

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Keywords: Mirrlees; incentive constraints; optimal policy;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Dagobert L. Brito & Jonathan H. Hamilton & Steven M. Slutsky & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1991. "Dynamic Optimal Income Taxation with Government Commitment," NBER Working Papers 3265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Sheshinski, Eytan, 1972. "The Optimal Linear Income-Tax," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(3), pages 297-302, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo & Mayshar, Joram & Lundholm, Michael, 1994. "The optimal two-bracket linear income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 269-290, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Fair, Ray C, 1971. "The Optimal Distribution of Income," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 551-79, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1996. "Tax evasion and the optimum general income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-249, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Harry F. Campbell, 1975. "Deadweight Loss and Commodity Taxation in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 8(3), pages 441-47, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Atkinson, Anthony B & Stern, N H, 1974. "Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(1), pages 119-28, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Dan Usher, 1986. "Tax Evasion and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds," Working Papers 637, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
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  9. Wildasin, David E, 1984. "On Public Good Provision with Distortionary Taxation," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 227-43, April.
  10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Pollution permits and compliance strategies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 85-125, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Roberts, Kevin, 1984. "The Theoretical Limits of Redistribution," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(2), pages 177-95, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Browning, Edgar K, 1976. "The Marginal Cost of Public Funds," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(2), pages 283-98, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Diamond, P. A. & Mirrlees, J. A., 1978. "A model of social insurance with variable retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 295-336, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Richard C. Cornes & Emilson C.D. Silva, 1996. "Transfers Between Jurisdictions with Private Information: The Equity/Efficiency Tradeoff," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 96/12, Department of Economics, Keele University.
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  16. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Horst Raff & John Wilson, 1997. "Income Redistribution with Well-Informed Local Governments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 407-427, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Blackorby, Charles & Donaldson, David, 1988. "Cash versus Kind, Self-selection, and Efficient Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 691-700, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. J. A. Mirrlees, 1976. "Optimal Tax Theory: A Synthesis," Working papers 176, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  20. Parsons, Donald O., 1996. "Imperfect 'tagging' in social insurance programs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 183-207, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Guesnerie, Roger & Seade, Jesus, 1982. "Nonlinear pricing in a finite economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 157-179, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Marceau, Nicolas & Boadway, Robin, 1994. " Minimum Wage Legislation and Unemployment Insurance as Instruments for Redistribution," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 96(1), pages 67-81.
  23. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1994. "The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 507-37, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1991. "Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation," Working Papers 828, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
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  25. Christiansen, Vidar, 1981. "Evaluation of Public Projects under Optimal Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(3), pages 447-57, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521629560 is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  28. Nichols, Albert L & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1982. "Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 372-77, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Blomquist, Suren & Christiansen, Vidar, 1995. " Public Provision of Private Goods as a Redistributive Device in an Optimum Income Tax Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 97(4), pages 547-67, December.
  30. Sadka, Efraim, 1976. "On Progressive Income Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(5), pages 931-35, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. Boadway, Robin & Marceau, Nicolas & Marchand, Maurice, 1996. "Investment in Education and the Time Inconsistency of Redistributive Tax Policy," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 63(250), pages 171-89, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  32. Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice, 1995. "The Use of Public Expenditures for Redistributive Purposes," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 45-59, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  33. Guesnerie, Roger & Roberts, Kevin, 1984. "Effective Policy Tools and Quantity Controls," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 59-86, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  34. Stern, Nicholas, 1982. "Optimum taxation with errors in administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 181-211, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  35. Robin Boadway & Nicolas Marceau, 1994. "Time inconsistency as a rationale for public unemployment insurance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 107-126, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  36. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1987. "Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new new welfare economics," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 991-1042 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. J. Atsu Amegashie & Bazoumana Ouattara & Eric Strobl, 2007. "Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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