Income Redistribution with Well-Informed Local Governments
Abstract
This paper examines the problem of redistributing incomeacross jurisdictions and to mobile workers within jurisdictionswhen local governments have better information than the centralgovernment about local production conditions. Under the centralgovernment‘s optimal policy, the subsidies or taxes that localgovernments provide to mobile workers normally depend on whetherthese governments are net recipients or net donors of interjurisdictionalincome transfers. Moreover, the public-input decisions of somelocal governments are distorted. The analysis demonstrates thatit may not be desirable to harmonize social policies across jurisdictions,even when the beneficiaries are quite mobile. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.
Volume (Year): 4 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 407-427
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915
Related research
Keywords: Income Redistribution; Labor Migration; Fiscal Federalism; Incomplete Information;References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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