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NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints

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Author Info
Martin Besfamille ()
Jean-Marie Lozachmeur

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Abstract

This paper analyses, in a simple two-region model, the undertaking of noxious facilities when the central government has limited prerogatives. The central government decides whether to construct a noxious facility in one of the regions, and how to …nance it. We study this problem under both full and asymmetric information on the damage caused by the noxious facility in the host region. We particularly emphasize the role of the central government prerogatives on the optimal allocations. We …nally discuss our results with respect to the previous literature on NIMBY and argue that taking into account these limited prerogatives is indeed important.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universidad Torcuato Di Tella in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 2008-11.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:udt:wpecon:2008-11

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Web page: http://www.utdt.edu/ver_contenido.php?id_contenido=439&id_item_menu=568
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Related research
Keywords: Noxious Facilities; NIMBY; Asymmetric information; Mechanism Design; Constitutional constraints;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

References listed on IDEAS
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    Other versions:
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    Other versions:
  10. Klibanoff, Peter & Morduch, Jonathan, 1995. "Decentralization, Externalities, and Efficiency," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 62(2), pages 223-47, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  21. Gradstein, Mark, 1994. "Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 877-97, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  23. Sangheon Kim, 2003. "An almost Ideal Solution to the Siting Problem of Publicly Provided Indivisible Goods," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 357-375, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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