Why not in your Backyard? On the Location and Size of a Public Facility
AbstractIn this paper, we tackle the issue of locating a public facility which provides a public good in a closed and populated territory. This facility generates differentiated benefits to neighborhoods depending on their distance from it. In the case of a Nimby facility, the smaller is the distance, the lower is the individual benefit. The opposite is true in the case of an anti-Nimby facility. We first characterize the optimal location which would be chosen by a social planner. Then we introduce a common-agency lobbying game, where agents attempt to influence the location and provision decisions by the government. Some interesting results arise in the case where only a subset of neighborhoods lobby. First, the solution of the lobbying game can replicate the optimal solution. Second, under-provision and over-provision of the public good may be obtained both in the Nimby and the anti-Nimby cases. The provision outcome depends on the presence of either a congestion effect or an agglomeration effect. Third, some non-lobbying neighborhoods may be better off than in the case where all neighborhoods lobby, which raises the possibility of free-riding at the lobbying stage.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2248.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Bellettini, Giorgio & Kempf, Hubert, 2013. "Why not in your backyard? On the location and size of a public facility," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 22-30.
- R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
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