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Political Economy Reasons for Government Inertia: The Role of Interest Groups in the Case of Access to Medicines

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  • Börner, Kira

Abstract

The reluctant reaction of western governments to the AIDS crisis in developing countries is only one example for policy areas where we observe a lack of political action despite a public interest in policy change. The reasons for that lie in the two-stage structure of the political decision-making process: Interest groups influence both the policy choice and the subsequent decision on the level of policy implementation. The lobbies' interest in reform and the issue-specific chance for compromise determine the policy choice. The interest groups' failure to agree on political strategies creates reduced incentives to support policy implementation.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 313.

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Date of creation: Mar 2004
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Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:313

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Keywords: policy choice ; policy implementation ; common agency ; lobbying ; NGOs;

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