This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Richard E. Baldwin
Frederic Robert-Nicoud
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
Governments frequently intervene to support domestic industries, but a surprising amount of this support goes to ailing sectors. We explain this with a lobbying model that allows for entry and sunk costs. Specifically, policy is influenced by pressure groups that incur lobbying expenses to create rents. In expanding industry, entry tends to erode such rents, but in declining industries, sunk costs rule out entry as long as the rents are not too high. This asymmetric appropriablity of rents means losers lobby harder. Thus it is not that government policy picks losers, it is that losers pick government policy.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
8756.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jan 2002Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8756Note: ITIContact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A. Phone: 617-868-3900 Email: Web page: http://www.nber.org More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().
Keywords: Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: F1 - International Economics - - Trade L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000.
"Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection ,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics ,
MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hansen, John Mark, 1990.
"Taxation and the political economy of the tariff ,"
International Organization ,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(04), pages 527-551, September.
[Downloadable!]
Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994.
"Protection for Sale ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992.
"Protection For Sale ,"
NBER Working Papers
4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992.
"Protection for Sale ,"
Papers
21-92, Tel Aviv.
Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992.
"Protection for Sale ,"
Papers
162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993.
"Protection for Sale ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1999.
"Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991.
"Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Leonardo Felli & Antonio Merlo, 2006.
"Endogenous Lobbying ,"
Journal of the European Economic Association ,
MIT Press, vol. 4(1), pages 180-215, 03.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Leonardo Felli & Antonio Merlo, 2001.
"Endogenous Lobbying ,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
04-043, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Oct 2004.
[Downloadable!] Felli, Leonhardo & Merlo, Antonio, 2000.
"Endogenous Lobbying ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!] Felli, L. & Merlo, A., 2000.
"Endogenous Lobbying ,"
Working Papers
00-04, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!] Felli, Leonardo & Merlo, Antonio, 2002.
"Endogenous Lobbying ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3174, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Leonardo Felli & Antonio Merlo, 2003.
"Endogenous Lobbying ,"
STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series
448, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
[Downloadable!] Leonardo Felli & Antonio Merlo, .
"Endogenous Lobbying ,"
CARESS Working Papres
00-03, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!] Rodrik, Dani, 1995.
"Political economy of trade policy ,"
Handbook of International Economics ,
in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hansen, John Mark, 1990.
"Taxation and the Political Economy of the Tariff ,"
International Organization ,
MIT Press, vol. 44(4), pages 527-51, Autumn.
Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987.
"Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hillman, Arye L, 1982.
"Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-87, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
George J. Stigler, 1971.
"The Theory of Economic Regulation ,"
Bell Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Baldwin, Richard & Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, 2006.
"Protection for Sale Made Easy ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5452, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986.
"Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Richard Baldwin, 1988.
"Hysteresis In Import Prices: The Beachhead Effect ,"
NBER Working Papers
2545, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Bohara, Alok K & Kaempfer, William H, 1991.
"A Test of Tariff Endogeneity in the United States ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 952-60, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Brainard, S. Lael & Verdier, Thierry, 1997.
"The political economy of declining industries: Senescent industry collapse revisited ,"
Journal of International Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 221-237, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996.
"Rent dissipation, free riding, and trade policy ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 795-803, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Robert E. Baldwin, 1982.
"The Political Economy of Protectionism ,"
NBER Chapters ,
in: Import Competition and Response, pages 263-292
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!]
Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, 1999.
"Policy Persistence ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1327-1336, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz, 1982.
"Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare ,"
NBER Chapters ,
in: Import Competition and Response, pages 223-244
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!]
Cassing, James H & Hillman, Arye L, 1986.
"Shifting Comparative Advantage and Senescent Industry Collapse ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 516-23, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Julio J. Rotemberg, 2003.
"Commercial Policy with Altruistic Voters ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 174-201, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Flam, Harry & Helpman, Elhanan, 1987.
"Industrial policy under monopolistic competition ,"
Journal of International Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 22(1-2), pages 79-102, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nicolas Marceau & Michael Smart, 2003.
"Corporate Lobbying and Commitment Failure in Capital Taxation ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 241-251, March.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Baldwin, Richard, 1987.
"Politically realistic objective functions and trade policy PROFs and tariffs ,"
Economics Letters ,
Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 287-290.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977.
"Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 297-308, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Anne O. Krueger, 1990.
"Asymmetries in Policy Between Exportables and Import-Competing Goods ,"
NBER Working Papers
2904, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Van Long, Ngo & Vousden, Neil, 1991.
"Protectionist responses and declining industries ,"
Journal of International Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 30(1-2), pages 87-103, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997.
"Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-69, August.
Kiminori Matsuyama, 1987.
"Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game ,"
Discussion Papers
738, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Niek Nahuis & Ben Geurts, 2004.
"Helping thy neighbour: productivity, welfare and international trade ,"
International Trade
0404008, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Yu-Fu Chen & I-Hui Cheng, 2005.
"Protection and employment under uncertainty: a real option approach ,"
Applied Economics ,
Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 37(2), pages 229-238, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Campos, Nauro F & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2006.
"Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5886, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Nauro F. Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, 2006.
"Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence ,"
CEDI Discussion Paper Series
06-14, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
[Downloadable!] Nauro F. Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, 2006.
"Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2313, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!] Nauro Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, 2007.
"Lobbying, corruption and political influence ,"
Public Choice ,
Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 1-21, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Campos, Nauro F. & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2008.
"Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3693, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Nauro F. Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, 2008.
"Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes ,"
CEDI Discussion Paper Series
08-16, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
[Downloadable!] Campos, Nauro F & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2008.
"Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6962, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Martin Gregor & Dalibor Roháč, 2009.
"The Optimal State Aid Control: No Control ,"
Working Papers IES
2009/14, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Mar 2009.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Richard Baldwin, 2007.
"Multilateralising Regionalism: Sphagetti Bowls as building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade ,"
Working Papers
id:1231, esocialsciences.com.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Baldwin, Richard, 2006.
"Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5775, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Richard Baldwin, 2006.
"Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade ,"
NBER Working Papers
12545, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Richard E. Baldwin, 2006.
"Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade ,"
The World Economy ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(11), pages 1451-1518, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) repec:bep:eapcon:v:3:y:2004:i:1:p:1278-1278 is not listed on IDEAS
Everaert, Greetje M.M., 2004.
"The Political Economy of Restructuring and Subsidisation: An International Perspective ,"
BOFIT Discussion Papers
12/2004, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Karacaovali, Baybars, 2006.
"Productivity matters for trade policy : theory and evidence ,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
3925, The World Bank.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Masters, William A. & Garcia, Andres F., 2009.
"Agricultural Price Distortion and Stabilization: Stylized facts and Hypothesis Tests ,"
Agricultural Distortions Working Paper
50301, World Bank.
[Downloadable!]
Garcia Pires, Armando José, 2006.
"Losers, Winners and Prisoner's Dilemma in International Subsidy Wars ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5979, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Martin, Philippe & Mayer, Thierry & Mayneris, Florian, 2008.
"Public Support to Clusters: A Firm Level Study of French “Local Productive Systems” ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7102, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Arnaud Costinot, 2008.
"Jobs, Jobs, Jobs: A "New" Perspective on Protectionism ,"
University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series
2006-05R, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
[Downloadable!]
Johannes Hers & Niek Nahuis, 2004.
"The Tower Of Babel? The Innovation System Approach Versus Mainstream Economics ,"
Method and Hist of Econ Thought
0403001, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Access and
download statistics Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by providing information about publications in your institution.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-14.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .