1. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2001. "Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 68(1), pages 67-82, January.
2. Nicolas Marceau & Michael Smart, 2000. "Business Tax Lobbying," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 102, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
3. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Representative democracy and capital taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 53-70, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
   • Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
   • Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Jaewoo Lee, 2000. "Political Influence and the Dynamic Consistency of Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 649-666, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Eckhard Janeba, 2000. "Tax Competition When Governments Lack Commitment: Excess Capacity as a Countervailing Threat," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1508-1519, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-77, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 2001. "Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 93-128, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-69, August.
10. Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, . "Policy Persistence," CARESS Working Papres 97-2, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, . ""Policy Persistence ''," CARESS Working Papres 95-19, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    • Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, . "Policy Persistence," Penn CARESS Working Papers 8a66677895e9fcb3f6d813c0c, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
    • Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Policy Persistence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1327-1336, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2009. "Property Rights and EconomicDevelopment," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 006, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Besley, Timothy J. & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2009. "Property Rights and Economic Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 7243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Robin Boadway & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2003. "Public Economics and Startup Entrepreneurs," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
3. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," CEP Discussion Papers dp0791, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Richard E. Baldwin & Frederic Robert-Nicoud, 2002. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," NBER Working Papers 8756, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 1064-1093, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Boerner, Kira, 2005. "Having Everyone in the Boat May Sink it - Interest Group Involvement and Policy Reforms," Discussion Papers in Economics 730, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
5. Börner, Kira, 2004. "Political Economy Reasons for Government Inertia: The Role of Interest Groups in the Case of Access to Medicines," Discussion Papers in Economics 313, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Kelly Edmiston & Shannon Mudd & Neven Valev, 2004. "Incentive Targeting, Influence Peddling, and Foreign Direct Investment," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 11(5), pages 647-660, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kelly Edmiston & Shannon Mudd & Neven Valev, 2000. "Incentive Targeting, Influence Peddling, and Foreign Direct Investment," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0007, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
   • Kelly D. Edmiston & Shannon Mudd & Neven T. Valev, 2004. "Incentive Targeting, Influence Peddling, and Foreign Direct Investment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 11(5), pages 647-660, 09. [Downloadable!]
7. David E. Wildasin, 2005. "Global Competition for Mobile Resources: Implications for Equity, Efficiency, and Political Economy," Working Papers 2005-08, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • David E. Wildasin, 2006. "Global Competition for Mobile Resources: Implications for Equity, Efficiency and Political Economy," CESifo Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(1), pages 61-110, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Stanley L. Winer & Walter Hettich, 2002. "The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis when Collective Choice Matters," Carleton Economic Papers 02-11, Carleton University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
9. Dino Falaschetti, 2004. "Can Voting Reduce Welfare? Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector," Public Economics 0401006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
10. Dino Falaschetti, 2004. "Can Voting Reduce Welfare? Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector," Public Economics 0401009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
11. John A. List & Daniel M. Sturm, 2004. "How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy," NBER Working Papers 10609, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • John A., List & Daniel, Sturm, 2006. "How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy," Discussion Papers in Economics 768, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • List, John & Sturm, Daniel M, 2004. "How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 4489, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • John A List & Daniel M Sturm, 2006. "How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 121(4), pages 1249-1281, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Dino Falaschetti, 2003. "Voter Turnout, Regulatory Commitment, and Capital Accumulation: Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector," Microeconomics 0311002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]