1. Matsuyama, Kiminori, 1990. "Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 480-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kiminori Matsuyama, 1987. "Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game," Discussion Papers 738, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
2. Tornell, Aaron, 1991. "Time Inconsistency of Protectionist Programs," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(3), pages 963-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Bennett T. McCallum, 1996. "Crucial Issues Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5597, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
   • Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
   • Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 403-14, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Tabellini, Guido, 1990. "Domestic politics and the international coordination of fiscal policies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3-4), pages 245-265, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Domestic Politics and the International Coordination of Fiscal Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 226, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Guido Tabellini, 1988. "Domestic Politics and the International Coordination of Fiscal Policies," UCLA Economics Working Papers 529, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-69, August.
9. Fischer, Stanley, 1980. "Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation and the benevolent dissembling government," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 93-107, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 496-805, September.
11. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Credibility and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Garfinkel, Michelle R, 1994. "Domestic Politics and International Conflict," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1294-1309, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Garfinkel, M.R., 1992. "Domestic Politics and International Conflict," Papers 90-92-30, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.

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1. Nicolas Marceau & Michael Smart, 2003. "Corporate Lobbying and Commitment Failure in Capital Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 241-251, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Marceau, Nicolas & Smart, Michael, 2002. "Corporate Lobbying and Commitment Failure in Capital Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
2. Aidt, T. & Magris, F., 2003. "Capital Taxation and Electoral Accountability," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0318, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Aidt, Toke S. & Magris, Francesco, 2006. "Capital taxation and electoral accountability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 277-291, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)