Can lobbying encourage abatement? Designing a new policy instrument
AbstractTaking a political economy perspective this paper proposes an alternative carbon abatement policy instrument with significant cant advantages over existing policy instruments. The key feature of the proposed carbon securities is that they entitle their owners to a fi xed proportion of ex ante unknown total emis-sions. The total level of carbon emissions is set by the political process after the carbon securities have been sold. A key benefit of the proposed carbon security is that it creates a group of stakeholders, whose interest is for a smaller level of emissions and which competes with industries that consume signifi cant amounts of carbon-based energy. The advantages over existing policy tools include an equilibrium carbon price closer to the level preferred by voters and a more predictable environmental policy in the presence of either climate or political uncertainty. (JEL: D72, Q54, Q58)
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Stirling, Division of Economics in its series Stirling Economics Discussion Papers with number 2012-03.
Date of creation: Mar 2012
Date of revision:
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Postal: Division of Economics, University of Stirling, Stirling, Scotland FK9 4LA
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climate policy; Lobbying;
Other versions of this item:
- Ian A. Lange & Sarah Polborn, 2012. "Can Lobbying Encourage Abatement? Designing a New Policy Instrument," CESifo Working Paper Series 3760, CESifo Group Munich.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-04-10 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENE-2012-04-10 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2012-04-10 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2012-04-10 (Positive Political Economics)
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