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Policy Persistence

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Author Info
Stephen Coate
Stephen Morris

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Abstract

Policy persistence refers to the tendency of the political process to maintain policies once they have been introduced. This paper develops a theory of policy persistence based on the idea that policies create incentives for beneficiaries to take actions which increase their willingness to pay for these policies in the future. The theory is used to show that policy persistence may lead to political failure, in the sense that policy sequences arising in political equilibrium can be Pareto dominated.

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Paper provided by University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences in its series CARESS Working Papres with number 97-2.

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Handle: RePEc:wop:pennca:97-2

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Braillard, S. Lael & Verdier, Thierry, 1994. "Lobbying and adjustment in declining industries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 586-595, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Policy uncertainty and private investment in developing countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 229-242, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Rausser, Gordon C, 1992. "Predatory versus Productive Government: The Case of U.S. Agricultural Policies," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 133-57, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Krusell, Per & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 1996. "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 301-29, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B, 1992. "Public versus Private Investment in Human Capital Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 813-34, August.
  7. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Papers 6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
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  9. Gordon Tullock, 1975. "The Transitional Gains Trap," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 671-678, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-56, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-7.

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