This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Representative democracy and capital taxation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Persson, Torsten
Tabellini, Guido

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-45MFPP9-6/2/275e94f86e5e8fd0452f2600a6fce30b
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 55 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 53-70
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:55:y:1994:i:1:p:53-70

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Dan Anderberg & Carlo Perroni, 2003. "Time-Consistent Policy and Politics: Does Voting Matter When Individuals Are Identical?," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1101-1101. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Nicolas Marceau & Michael Smart, 2003. "Corporate Lobbying and Commitment Failure in Capital Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 241-251, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Johan Lagerlöf, 1998. "Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Know How the Economy Works?," CIG Working Papers FS IV 98-07, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised May 1999. [Downloadable!]
  4. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000875, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Laura Marsiliani & Thomas I Renstrom, 2005. "Political Institutions, Environmental Policy and Growth," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 38, Money Macro and Finance Research Group. [Downloadable!]
  6. Nicolas Marceau & Michael Smart, 2000. "Business Tax Lobbying," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 102, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
  7. Gradstein, Mark, 1999. "An Economic Rationale for Public Education: The Value of Commitment," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Didier Laussel & Raymond Riezman, 2001. "The Sources of Protectionist Drift in Representative Democracies," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Roine, Jesper, 2003. "The political economics of not paying taxes," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 530, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Mahieu, GŽraldine & Rottier, StŽphane, 2000. "Preferences over Capital Income versus Labor Income Taxation," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2000021, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
  11. Aidt, T. & Magris, F., 2003. "Capital Taxation and Electoral Accountability," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0318, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & George Economides & Pantelis Kammas, 2009. "Do political incentives matter for tax policies? Ideology, opportunism and the tax structure," Working Papers 2009_12, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
  13. Laura Marsiliani & Thomas Renstrom, 2002. "Environmental Policy and Capital Movements: The Role of Government Commitment," Wallis Working Papers WP31, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  14. Rune Jansen Hagen & Gaute Torsvik, 2007. "Irreversible Investments, Dynamic Inconsistency and Policy Convergence," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  15. Konrad, Kai A, 1999. "Privacy, Time Consistent Optimal Labour Income Taxation and Education Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2326, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Marsiliani, Laura & Renström, Thomas I, 2003. "Environmental Policy and Capital Movements: The Role of Government Commitment," CEPR Discussion Papers 3727, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Laura Marsiliani & Thomas Renström, 2007. "The Role of Government Commitment for Environmental Policy and Capital Movements," Topics in Macroeconomics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 6(3), pages 1229-1229. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Laura Marsiliani & Thomas I. Renström, 2003. "Environmental Policy and Capital Movements: The Role of Government Commitment," Working Papers 2003.4, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  19. Toke A. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz, 2007. "An Economic Theory of Political Institutions: Foreign Intervention and Overseas Investments," Discussion Papers 07-03, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. [Downloadable!]
  20. Adam, Christopher S. & O'Connell, Stephen A., 1998. "Aid, taxation, and development: analytical perspectives on aid effectiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1885, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1990. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," NBER Working Papers 3460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About five million pdf files are downloaded through RePEc every year.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.