Inefficient equilibria in lobbying
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series ULB Institutional Repository with number 2013/5901.
Date of creation: Dec 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: Journal of Public Economics (2001) v.82 n° 3,p.349-375
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