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Inefficient equilibria in lobbying

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  • Georg Kirchsteiger
  • Andrea Prat

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series ULB Institutional Repository with number 2013/5901.

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Date of creation: Dec 2001
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Publication status: Published in: Journal of Public Economics (2001) v.82 n° 3,p.349-375
Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/5901

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References

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  1. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
  3. Leo K. Simon and William R. Zame., 1987. "Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Economics Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley 8756, University of California at Berkeley.
  4. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Scholarly Articles 3450061, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  5. KONISHI, Hideo & LE BRETON, Michel & WEBER, Shlomo, . "On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1383, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Börner, Kira, 2004. "Political Economy Reasons for Government Inertia: The Role of Interest Groups in the Case of Access to Medicines," Discussion Papers in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 313, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  2. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2009. "Selecting equilibria in common agency games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 604-634, March.
  3. Boerner, Kira, 2005. "Having Everyone in the Boat May Sink it - Interest Group Involvement and Policy Reforms," Discussion Papers in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 730, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  4. Emma Aisbett & Carol McAusland, 2011. "Firm Characteristics and Influence on Government Rule-Making: theory and evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University 649, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
  5. Ujhelyi, Gergely, 2009. "Campaign finance regulation with competing interest groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 93(3-4), pages 373-391, April.
  6. Masahiro Endoh, 2005. "Cross-Border Political Donations and Pareto-Efficient Tariffs," Working Papers, Economic Growth Center, Yale University 915, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
  7. Klingelhöfer, Jan, 2013. "Lobbying and Elections," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79722, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  8. Chiesa, Gabriella & Denicolò, Vincenzo, 2009. "Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 296-311, January.
  9. Fredriksson, Per G. & Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Political instability, corruption and policy formation: the case of environmental policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1383-1405, August.
  10. Uk Hwang & Francesco Magris, 2005. "Intergenerational Conflicts and the Resource Policy Formation of a Short-Lived Government," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 141(III), pages 437-457, September.
  11. Arthur J.H.C. Schram, 2002. "Experimental Public Choice," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-106/1, Tinbergen Institute.

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