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Firm characteristics and influence on government rule-making: Theory and evidence

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  • Aisbett, Emma
  • McAusland, Carol

Abstract

An adversarial game is used to model a firm's intrinsic and exerted influence over a regulator. Data from the World Business Environment Survey provide strong evidence in support of model hypotheses across a wide range of government agents, countries, and regulatory areas. Of particular relevance to public debate, the theory and econometric analysis show that large firms are more likely to be influential and to benefit from subsidies and low tax constraints. However, large firms are also likely to face greater regulatory constraint from environmental and safety rules.

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  • Aisbett, Emma & McAusland, Carol, 2013. "Firm characteristics and influence on government rule-making: Theory and evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 214-235.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:29:y:2013:i:c:p:214-235
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.09.005
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    Cited by:

    1. Schuster, Philipp & Schmitt, Carina & Traub, Stefan, 2013. "The retreat of the state from entrepreneurial activities: A convergence analysis for OECD countries, 1980–2007," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 95-112.
    2. Davis, Christina & Fuchs, Andreas & Johnson , Kristina, 2014. "State Control and the Effects of Foreign Relations on Bilateral Trade," Working Papers 0576, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    3. Christina L. Davis & Andreas Fuchs & Kristina Johnson, 2019. "State Control and the Effects of Foreign Relations on Bilateral Trade," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(2), pages 405-438, February.
    4. Bruno De Borger & Amihai Glazer, 2015. "Inducing political action by workers," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(4), pages 1117-1144, April.
    5. Susanna Thede & Nils-Åke Gustafson, 2017. "Bending the rules, breaking the rules: How corruption and lobbying affect the investment market selection of Swedish firms," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(7), pages 1266-1290, July.
    6. Michael Rochlitz, 2016. "Collective Action Abroad: How Foreign Investors Organize Evidence from Foreign Business Associations In the Russian Federation," HSE Working papers WP BRP 32/PS/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political economy; Regulation; Subsidies; Influence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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