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On the Determinants and Effects of Political Influence

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  • Chong, Alberto E.
  • Gradstein, Mark

Abstract

This paper uses a large cross-country survey of business firms to assess their influence on government policies. It is found that influence is associated with larger, government-owned firms that have a high degree of ownership concentration. In contrast, foreign ownership matters little. It is also found that the extent to which government policies and legislation are viewed as impeding firm growth decreases with political influence and, independently, with a country's level of institutional quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Chong, Alberto E. & Gradstein, Mark, 2007. "On the Determinants and Effects of Political Influence," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3347, Inter-American Development Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:3347
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jay Choi & Marcel Thum, 2009. "The economics of politically-connected firms," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(5), pages 605-620, October.
    2. Aisbett, Emma & McAusland, Carol, 2013. "Firm characteristics and influence on government rule-making: Theory and evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 214-235.
    3. Norbert Walter & Steffen Kern, 2011. "Politikberatung im EU-Finanzbinnenmarkt: vom Lamfalussy-Prozess zur europäischen Aufsicht," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 80(1), pages 91-105.
    4. Dellis, Konstantinos & Sondermann, David, 2017. "Lobbying in Europe: new firm-level evidence," Working Paper Series 2071, European Central Bank.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    politics; institutions; influence; ownership; government policies; firm growth;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

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