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• Alberto Chong

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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series RES Working Papers with number 4541.

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Date of creation: Oct 2007
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4541

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1. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 2005. "Corporate Campaign Contributions, Repeat Giving, and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(1), pages 41-71, April.
2. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March. [Downloadable!]
3. Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, 2007. "The Economics of Politically Connected Firms," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
4. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 401-425, June.
   Other versions:
   • Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1934, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   • Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," NBER Working Papers 8650, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Faccio, Mara & Parsley, David, 2006. "Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Political Connections," CEPR Discussion Papers 5460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1998. "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," CRSP working papers 349, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
   Other versions:
   • Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1996. "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress:Theory And Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 126, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State. [Downloadable!]
   • Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, . "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services', Political Action Committees," CRSP working papers 465, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
   • Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Toke S. Aidt, 2003. "Economic analysis of corruption: a survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(491), pages F632-F652, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Irwin, Douglas A & Kroszner, Randall S, 1999. "Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 643-73, October.
12. Stratmann, Thomas, 2002. "Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 345-73, October.

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