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Sobre los determinantes y efectos de la influencia de politica (On the Determinants and Effects of Political Influence)

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  • Alberto Chong

    ()

  • Mark Gradstein

Abstract

En este trabajo se emplea una encuesta de gran alcance entre empresas de varios países para evaluar su influencia en las políticas oficiales. Se halló que la influencia guarda una relación con empresas más grandes propiedad del Estado que tienen un alto grado de concentración de la propiedad. Por el contrario, la tenencia foránea tiene escasa importancia. También se descubrió que la medida en que se considera que las políticas gubernamentales y la legislación entorpecen el crecimiento de las empresas disminuye junto con la influencia política e, independientemente, junto con el nivel de calidad institucional del país. (Disponible en inglés)

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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4541.

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Date of creation: Oct 2007
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4541

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  1. Choi, Jay Pil & Thum, Marcel, 2008. "The economics of politically-connected firms," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 07/08, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  2. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
  3. Stratmann, Thomas, 2002. "Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 345-73, October.
  4. Toke S. Aidt, 2003. "Economic analysis of corruption: a survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(491), pages F632-F652, November.
  5. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 401-425, June.
  6. Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1996. "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress:Theory And Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State 126, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  7. Faccio, Mara & Parsley, David, 2006. "Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Political Connections," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November.
  9. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 2005. "Corporate Campaign Contributions, Repeat Giving, and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(1), pages 41-71, April.
  10. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
  11. Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, 2005. "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 120(4), pages 1371-1411, November.
  12. Irwin, Douglas A & Kroszner, Randall S, 1999. "Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 643-73, October.
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