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The Political Economy of Privatization and Competition: Cross-Country Evidence from the Telecommunications Sector

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Author Info
Colin Xu, Lixin
Li, Wei
Zhen-Wei Qiang, Christine

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Abstract

Using a new data set of the telecommunications sector on privatization (1981-98 for 167 countries) and competition policies (1990-98 for roughly 50 countries), this Paper investigates the political economy determinants of privatization and liberalization in the telecommunications sector. Building on the framework of a generalized private interest theory, we derive hypotheses on how the characteristics of private interest groups and political structure affect policy changes in the telecommunications sector. We pay particular attention to how the effects of interest groups on policies vary from more democratic to less democratic countries. We find reasonably strong evidence in favour of the generalized interest group theory. Countries with stronger pro-reform interest groups (the financial services and the urban consumers) are more likely to reform. But countries are more likely to maintain state-owned monopolies in the sector when such a governance mode yields a higher pay-off for the governments - when the telecommunications sector has higher profitability and when the fiscal deficit is higher and cannot be more easily financed by borrowing from the financial market. Democracy appears to affect the pace of reform by magnifying the voices of interest groups and by moderating politicians’ discretion.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2825.

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Date of creation: Jun 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2825

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Related research
Keywords: Competition Democracy Political Economy Political Structure Privatization Special Interest Groups Telecommunications

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

Cited by:
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  1. Gual, Jordi & Trillas, Francesc, 2006. "Telecommunications policies: Measurement and determinants," IESE Research Papers D/630, IESE Business School. [Downloadable!]
  2. Tomaso Duso, 2002. "On the Politics of the Regulatory Reform: Econometric Evidence from the OECD Countries," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-07, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
  3. Gual, Jordi & Trillas, Francesc, 2003. "Telecommunications policies: Determinants and impact," IESE Research Papers D/510, IESE Business School. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jordi Gual & Francesc Trillas, 2006. "Telecommunications Policies: Measurement and Determinants," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 5(2), pages 249-272, June. [Downloadable!]
  5. Fink, Carsten & Mattoo, Aaditya & Rathindran, Randeep, 2002. "An assessment of telecommunications reform in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2909, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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