Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Differences between Politically Connected and Nonconnected Firms: A Cross-Country Analysis

Contents:

Author Info

  • Mara Faccio
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    "Evidence from firms in 47 countries shows that companies with political connections have higher leverage and higher market shares, but they underperform compared to nonconnected companies on an accounting basis. Differences between connected and unconnected firms are more pronounced when political links are stronger. Differences also vary depending on the level of corruption and the degree of economic development in individual countries." Copyright (c) 2010 Financial Management Association International.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1755-053X.2010.01099.x
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Financial Management Association International in its journal Financial Management.

    Volume (Year): 39 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 3 (09)
    Pages: 905-928

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:bla:finmgt:v:39:y:2010:i:3:p:905-928

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: University of South Florida 4202 E. Fowler Ave. COBA #3331, Tampa, FL 33620
    Phone: 813-974-3318
    Fax: 813-974-2084
    Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0046-3892
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0046-3892

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Zheng, Xiaolan & El Ghoul, Sadok & Guedhami, Omrane & Kwok, Chuck C.Y., 2012. "National culture and corporate debt maturity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 468-488.
    2. Belot, François, 2010. "Excess control rights and corporate acquisitions," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5922, Paris Dauphine University.
    3. Hasan, Iftekhar & Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kowalewski , Oskar & Kozlowski , Lukasz, 2014. "Politically connected firms in Poland and their access to bank financing," BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/2014, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    4. Cull, Robert & Li, Wei & Sun, Bo & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2013. "Government connections and financial constraints : evidence from a large representative sample of Chinese firms," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6352, The World Bank.
    5. André Medeiros Sztutman & Dante Mendes Aldrighi, 2014. "Financiamento Das Campanhas Eleitoraisde 2006 Por Grupos Econômicos E Empréstimos Do Bndes," Anais do XL Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 40th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 058, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    6. Su, Zhong-qin & Fung, Hung-Gay & Huang, Deng-shi & Shen, Chung-Hua, 2014. "Cash dividends, expropriation, and political connections: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 260-272.
    7. Humphery-Jenner, Mark & Powell, Ronan, 2014. "Firm size, sovereign governance, and value creation: Evidence from the acquirer size effect," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 57-77.
    8. Amore, Mario Daniele & Bennedsen, Morten, 2013. "The value of local political connections in a low-corruption environment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 387-402.
    9. Arvate, Paulo & Barbosa, Klenio de Souza & Fuzitani, Eric, 2013. "Campaign donation and government contracts in Brazilian states," Textos para discussão 336, Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
    10. Ma, Liangbo & Ma, Shiguang & Tian, Gary, 2013. "Political connections, founder-managers, and their impact on tunneling in China's listed firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 312-339.
    11. Ebrahim, M. Shahid & Girma, Sourafel & Shah, M. Eskandar & Williams, Jonathan, 2014. "Dynamic capital structure and political patronage: The case of Malaysia," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 117-128.
    12. Jianfeng Wu & Sali Li & Zijie Li, 2013. "The contingent value of CEO political connections: A study on IPO performance in China," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 1087-1114, December.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:finmgt:v:39:y:2010:i:3:p:905-928. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.