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Lobbying in Europe: new firm-level evidence

Author

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  • Dellis, Konstantinos
  • Sondermann, David

Abstract

Lobbying can provide policy makers with important sector-specific information and thereby facilitating informed decisions. If going far beyond this, in particular if successfully influencing policy makers to unnecessarily tighten regulation or not opening already excessively regulated markets, it could potentially reduce overall economic welfare. We create a unique firm-level database on EU lobby activity and firm characteristics. We tend to find that firms in more protected sector, e.g. firms from non-tradable or higher regulated sectors tend to spend more for lobby activities. Also such firms tend to have higher profit margins and lower productivity, as often the case in sheltered sectors. JEL Classification: D72, D78, O38

Suggested Citation

  • Dellis, Konstantinos & Sondermann, David, 2017. "Lobbying in Europe: new firm-level evidence," Working Paper Series 2071, European Central Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20172071
    Note: 943715
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Matej Bajgar & Giuseppe Berlingieri & Sara Calligaris & Chiara Criscuolo & Jonathan Timmis, 2019. "Industry concentration in Europe and North America," CEP Discussion Papers dp1654, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    2. Marcel Hanegraaff & Arlo Poletti, 2021. "The Rise of Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: An Agenda for Future Research," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 839-855, July.
    3. Philippon, Thomas & Gutierrez, German, 2018. "How EU Markets Became More Competitive Than US Markets: A Study of Institutional Drift," CEPR Discussion Papers 12983, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Christian Reiner & Maximilian Benner, 2022. "Cooperation bias in regional policy: Is competition neglected?," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 69(1), pages 187-221, August.
    5. Ahmed Waqar Qasim & Jun-ichi Itaya, 2019. "Heterogeneous Firms and Lobby Participation Decision," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(4), pages 2415-2422.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    lobbying; political economy; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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