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The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying

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  • William R. Kerr

    ()

  • William F. Lincoln

    ()

  • Prachi Mishra

    ()

Abstract

How is economic policy made? In this paper we study a key determinant of the answer to the question: lobbying by fi rms. Estimating a binary choice model of firm behavior, we fi nd signifi cant evidence for the idea that barriers to entry induce persistence in lobbying. The existence of these costs is further confi rmed in studying how fi rms responded to a particular policy change: the expiration of legislation relating to the H-1B visa. Due to its in‡fluence on fi rm behavior, we argue that this persistence fundamentally changes the environment in which legislation is made.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number wp1072.

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Length: pages
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2014
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Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2014-1072

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Keywords: lobbying; political economy; immigration; H-1B.;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kammerer, Hannes, 2013. "Lobbying for Subsidies with Heterogeneous Firms," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79767, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  2. Sari Pekkala Kerr & William R. Kerr & William F. Lincoln, 2013. "Skilled Immigration and the Employment Structures of U.S. Firms," Harvard Business School Working Papers 14-040, Harvard Business School.
  3. William R. Kerr, 2013. "U.S. High-Skilled Immigration, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship: Empirical Approaches and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 19377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Jennifer Abel-Koch, 2013. "Endogenous Trade Policy with Heterogeneous Firms," Working Papers 1306, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 01 Aug 2013.
  5. Ian A. Lange & Sarah Polborn, 2012. "Can Lobbying Encourage Abatement? Designing a New Policy Instrument," CESifo Working Paper Series 3760, CESifo Group Munich.

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