Revolving Door Lobbyists
AbstractWashington's "revolving door"â€“â€“the movement from government service into the lobbying industryâ€“â€“is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24 percent drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period, and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 102 (2012)
Issue (Month): 7 (December)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
- L84 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Personal, Professional, and Business Services
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