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Endogenous trade policy and lobby formation: an application to the free-rider problem

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  • Magee, Christopher
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.

    Volume (Year): 57 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 2 (August)
    Pages: 449-471

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:57:y:2002:i:2:p:449-471

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552

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    1. Rodrik, Dani, 1986. "Tariffs, subsidies, and welfare with endogenous policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 285-299, November.
    2. Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R., 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73373, Tilburg University.
    3. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September.
    4. Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz, 1982. "Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 223-244 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Devashish Mitra, 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1116-1134, December.
    6. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1993. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Papers 1-93, Tel Aviv.
    7. Maggi, G & Rodriguez-Clare, A, 1996. "The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures," Papers 180, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    8. Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Is There a Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs, Trigger Strategies, and the Number of Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 652-60, June.
    9. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier.
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    Cited by:
    1. Cavalcanti Ferreira, Pedro & Facchini, Giovanni, 2005. "Trade liberalization and industrial concentration: Evidence from Brazil," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 432-446, May.
    2. Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "Sincere Lobby Formation," MPRA Paper 28249, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Yu-Bong Lai, 2007. "The Optimal Distribution of Pollution Rights in the Presence of Political Distortions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(3), pages 367-388, March.
    4. Povilas Lastauskas, 2013. "Europe's Revolving Doors: Import Competition and Endogenous Firm Entry Institutions," Kiel Advanced Studies Working Papers 464, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    5. Stéphane BECUWE (GREThA, CNRS, UMR 5113) & Bertrand BLANCHETON (GREThA, CNRS, UMR 5113, 2011. "Tariff growth paradox between 1850 and 1913: a critical survey (In French)," Cahiers du GREThA 2011-24, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
    6. Mayer, Wolfgang & Mujumdar, Sudesh, 2012. "Lobbying: Buying and utilizing access," Economics Discussion Papers 2012-15, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    7. Richard Damania & Per Fredriksson & Thomas Osang, 2004. "Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 279-308, February.
    8. William R. Kerr & William F. Lincoln & Prachi Mishra, 2014. "The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp1072, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    9. Jussila Hammes, Johanna, 2011. "Path dependence: Biofuels policy under uncertainty about greenhouse gas emissions," Working papers in Transport Economics 2011:1, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
    10. Bombardini, Matilde, 2008. "Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 329-348, July.
    11. Povilas Lastauskas, 2013. "Europe’s Revolving Doors: Import Competition and Endogenous Firm Entry InstitutionS," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1360, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    12. Antonio Tena Junguito, 2008. "Bairoch revisited. Tariff structure and growth in the late 19th century," Working Papers in Economic History wp08-04, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Historia Económica e Instituciones.
    13. Kara M. Reynolds, 2009. "Overcoming Free Riding: A Cross Country Analysis of Firm Participation in Antidumping Petitions," Working Papers 2009-01, American University, Department of Economics.
    14. Kim, Young-Han & Kim, Sang-Kee, 2012. "Welfare effects of competitive lobbying efforts in international oligopoly markets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 614-620.
    15. Zudenkova, Galina, 2012. "Lobbying as a Guard against Extremism," Working Papers 2072/184036, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    16. Nathan Nunn & Daniel Trefler, 2006. "Putting the Lid on Lobbying: Tariff Structure and Long-Term Growth when Protection is for Sale," NBER Working Papers 12164, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Aradhna Aggarwal, 2008. "Anti-dumping Protection: Who Gets It? An Exploratory Analysis of Anti-dumping Use in the Most Active User Countries," Working Papers id:1374, eSocialSciences.
    18. Olper, Alessandro, 2007. "Land inequality, government ideology and agricultural protection," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 67-83, February.
    19. Mayer, Wolfgang & Mujumdar, Sudesh, 2014. "Lobbying: Buying and utilizing access," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 8(2), pages 1-35.

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