Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Heterogenous Groups and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods

Contents:

Author Info

  • Cheikbossian, Guillaume

Abstract

We present a model of endogenous public good provision and group rent-seeking influence e.g. lobbying. Specifically, two groups with different preferences over public good consumption and different sizes engage in rent-seeking activities to influence policymaking in their preferred direction. When there is within-group cooperation in lobbying, both groups neutralize each other in the political process. Without within-group cooperation, the free-rider problem in lobbying makes the smaller group politically influent. In both cases, rent-seeking by each group is increasing in the degree of preference heterogeneity and in membership size of both groups.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.laser.univ-montp1.fr/Cahiers/cahier160305.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 500 Can't connect to www.laser.univ-montp1.fr:80 (10060). If this is indeed the case, please notify (Jean-Christophe POUDOU)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1 in its series Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) with number 2005.16.

as in new window
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mop:lasrwp:2005.16

Contact details of provider:
Postal: LASER, Faculté d'Economie, Avenue Raymond Dugrand, CS 79606, 34960 MONTPELLIER Cedex 2, France
Web page: http://www.laser.univ-montp1.fr
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Public Goods; Rent-seeking; Free-rider problem;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. " Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-30, March.
  2. Cheikbossian, G., 2004. "Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized System," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2004.12, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
  3. Mark Gradstein, 1995. "Intensity Of Competition, Entry And Entry Deterrence In Rent Seeking Contests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 79-91, 03.
  4. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  5. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Magee,Stephen P. & Brock,William A. & Young,Leslie, 1989. "Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521362474, October.
  7. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Katz, Eliakim & Tokatlidu, Julia, 1996. "Group competition for rents," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 599-607, December.
  9. Lorz, Jens Oliver, 1996. "Capital mobility, tax competition, and lobbying for redistributive capital taxation," Kiel Working Papers 779, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  10. Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1990. "Public Goods, Rent Dissipation, And Candidate Competition," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 115-132, 07.
  11. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-42, July.
  12. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-27, August.
  13. Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. " Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
  14. Alesina, Alberto & La Ferrara, Eliana, 2005. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance," Scholarly Articles 4553005, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  15. Coughlin, Peter J & Mueller, Dennis C & Murrell, Peter, 1990. "Electoral Politics, Interest Groups, and the Size of Government," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(4), pages 682-705, October.
  16. Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Is There a Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs, Trigger Strategies, and the Number of Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 652-60, June.
  17. Dawes, Robyn M & Thaler, Richard H, 1988. "Anomalies: Cooperation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 187-97, Summer.
  18. Toke Aidt, 1997. "Cooperative lobbying and endogenous trade policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 455-475, December.
  19. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Oto-Peralías, Daniel & Romero-Ávila, Diego & Usabiaga, Carlos, 2013. "Does fiscal decentralization mitigate the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 205-231.
  2. Kovenock, Dan & Roberson, Brian, 2011. "Non-partisan ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts and policy outcomes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 728-739.
  3. Sheremeta, Roman, 2009. "Essays on Experimental Investigation of Lottery Contests," MPRA Paper 49888, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Angelopoulos, Konstantinos & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 2009. "The social cost of rent seeking in Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 280-299, September.
  5. Oskar Nupia, 2011. "Rent-seeking For Public Goods: Group´s Size and Wealth Heterogeneity," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 008914, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
  6. Van Long, Ngo, 2013. "The theory of contests: A unified model and review of the literature," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 161-181.
  7. Toshihiro Ihori & C. Yang, 2012. "Laffer paradox, Leviathan, and political contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 137-148, April.
  8. Aisbett, Emma & McAusland, Carol, 2013. "Firm characteristics and influence on government rule-making: Theory and evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 214-235.
  9. Hattori, Keisuke, 2011. "A Note on Within-group Cooperation and Between-group Interaction in the Private Provision of Public Goods," MPRA Paper 32045, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Gil S Epstein & Yosef Mealem, 2012. "Cooperation and Effort in Group Contests," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(1), pages 624-638.
  11. Matthias Kräkel, 2009. "Competitive Careers as a Way to Mediocracy," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse25_2009, University of Bonn, Germany.
  12. Heinrich Ursprung, 2012. "The evolution of sharing rules in rent seeking contests: Incentives crowd out cooperation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 149-161, October.
  13. Rustam Jamilov, 2013. "Optimal Resource Rent," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp1046, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  14. Toshihiro Ihori & C.C. Yang, 2010. "Laffer paradox, Leviathan, and Political Contest," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-769, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  15. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 175-181, January.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mop:lasrwp:2005.16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jean-Christophe POUDOU).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.