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Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Arye L. Hillman (Bar-Ilan University)
John G. Riley (Israel)
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number
452.
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Date of creation: 01 Sep 1987Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:452Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1981.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts ,"
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Other versions: Bhagwati, Jagdish N., 1980.
"Lobbying and welfare ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
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Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 1987.
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Economic Journal ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 1986.
"Rent seeking and entry ,"
Economics Letters ,
Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 207-212.
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Hillman, Arye L. & Katz, Eliakim, 1987.
"Hierarchical structure and the social costs of bribes and transfers ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 129-142, November.
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Richard A. Posner, 1974.
"Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation ,"
NBER Working Papers
0055, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981.
"Optimal Auctions ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Hillman, Arye L & Katz, Eliakim, 1984.
"Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 104-10, March.
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Harold Demsetz, 1979.
"The Growth of Government ,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
157, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Long, Ngo Van & Vousden, Neil J, 1987.
"Risk-Averse Rent Seeking with Shared Rents ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(388), pages 971-85, December.
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Krueger, Anne O, 1974.
"The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
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Hillman, Arye L, 1982.
"Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-87, December.
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Tollison, Robert D, 1982.
"Rent Seeking: A Survey ,"
Kyklos ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602.
Becker, Gary S., 1985.
"Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Becker, Gary S, 1983.
"A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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