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A two-stage rent-seeking contest for instrument choice and revenue division, applied to environmental policy

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  • Dijkstra, Bouwe R.
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

    Volume (Year): 14 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 2 (May)
    Pages: 281-301

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:14:y:1998:i:2:p:281-301

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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    1. Hillman, Arye L. & Katz, Eliakim, 1987. "Hierarchical structure and the social costs of bribes and transfers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 129-142, November.
    2. Lee, Sanghack, 1995. " Endogenous Sharing Rules in Collective-Group Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(1-2), pages 31-44, October.
    3. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-27, August.
    4. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Shogren, Jason F, 1995. " Competitive-Share Group Formation in Rent-Seeking Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(1-2), pages 113-26, April.
    5. Cairns, Robert D., 1989. "Dynamic rent seeking," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 315-334, August.
    6. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
    7. Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1990. "Public Goods, Rent Dissipation, And Candidate Competition," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 115-132, 07.
    8. Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249.
    9. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "Rigging The Lobbying Process: An Application Of The All- Pay Auction," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1002, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    10. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Delegation in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 281-298, May.
    11. Linster, Bruce G, 1993. " Stackelberg Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 307-21, October.
    12. Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521311120.
    13. Glazer, Amihai, 1993. " On the Incentives to Establish and Play Political Rent-Seeking Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 139-48, February.
    14. Linster, Bruce G, 1994. " Cooperative Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 23-34, October.
    15. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
    16. Dewees, Donald N, 1983. "Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 21(1), pages 53-71, January.
    17. Katz, Eliakim & Tokatlidu, Julia, 1996. "Group competition for rents," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 599-607, December.
    18. Spulber, Daniel F., 1985. "Effluent regulation and long-run optimality," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 103-116, June.
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    Cited by:
    1. Anger, Niels & Böhringer, Christoph & Oberndorfer, Ulrich, 2008. "Public Interest vs. Interest Groups: Allowance Allocation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-023, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    2. Aidt, T.S.Toke Skovsgaard & Dutta, Jayasri, 2004. "Transitional politics: emerging incentive-based instruments in environmental regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 458-479, May.
    3. Fouquet, Roger, 2012. "The demand for environmental quality in driving transitions to low-polluting energy sources," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 138-149.
    4. Alberto F. Alesina & Francesco Passarelli, 2010. "Regulation Versus Taxation," NBER Working Papers 16413, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Joschka Gerigk & Ian A. MacKenzie & Markus Ohndorf, 2014. "A model of benchmarking regulation: revisiting the efficiency of environmental standards," Discussion Papers Series 519, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    6. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 2007. "An investment contest to influence environmental policy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 300-324, November.
    7. Aidt, Toke S., 2010. "Green taxes: Refunding rules and lobbying," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 31-43, July.

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