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An investment contest to influence environmental policy

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  • Dijkstra, Bouwe R.
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Resource and Energy Economics.

    Volume (Year): 29 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 4 (November)
    Pages: 300-324

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:29:y:2007:i:4:p:300-324

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505569

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    References

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    1. Fredriksson, Per G., 1998. "Environmental policy choice: Pollution abatement subsidies," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 51-63, March.
    2. Brad Barham & Roger Ware, 1991. "A Sequential Entry Model with Strategic Use of Excess Capacity," Working Papers 835, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    3. Bergland, Harald & Clark, Derek J. & Pedersen, Pal Andreas, 2002. "Rent-seeking and quota regulation of a renewable resource," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 263-279, June.
    4. Gersbach, Hans & Glazer, Amihai, 1998. "Markets and regulatory hold-up problems," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt9gf9t35g, University of California Transportation Center.
    5. R. M. Isaac & J. M. Walker, 2010. "Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contribution mechanism," Levine's Working Paper Archive 310, David K. Levine.
    6. Bohringer, Christoph & Lange, Andreas, 2005. "On the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2041-2055, November.
    7. Yao, Dennis A., 1988. "Strategic responses to automobile emissions control: A game-theoretic analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 419-438, December.
    8. Miravete, E.J., 1997. "Time-Consistent Protection With Learning by Doing," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 395.97, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    9. Liston-Heyes, Catherine, 2001. "Setting the Stakes in Environmental Contests," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-12, January.
    10. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 57-73, February.
    11. Baik Kyung Hwan & Shogren Jason F., 1994. "Environmental Conflicts with Reimbursement for Citizen Suits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-20, July.
    12. Schwartz, Marius & Baumann, Michael, 1988. "Entry-deterrence externalities and relative firm size," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 181-197.
    13. Aidt, Toke S., 1998. "Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-16, July.
    14. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
    15. Petrakis, Emmanuel & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 2003. "Location decisions of a polluting firm and the time consistency of environmental policy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 197-214, May.
    16. Fischer, Stanley, 1980. "Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation and the benevolent dissembling government," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 93-107, May.
    17. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1997. "Environmental Conflicts and the SLAPP," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 253-273, July.
    18. Gregory S. Amacher & Arun S. Malik, 2002. "Pollution Taxes When Firms Choose Technologies," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 891-906, April.
    19. Graichen, Patrick R & Requate, Till & Dijkstra, Bouwe R, 2001. " How to Win the Political Contest: A Monopolist vs. Environmentalists," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 108(3-4), pages 273-93, September.
    20. Harald Bergland & Derek J. Clark & Pål Andreas Pedersen, 2004. "History-dependent Quantity Regulation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 82(3), pages 225-248, 07.
    21. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
    22. Carmen Arguedas & Hamid Hamoudi, 2004. "Controlling Pollution with Relaxed Regulations," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 85-104, 07.
    23. Leahy, Dermot & Neary, J Peter, 1994. "Learning by Doing, Precommitment and Infant-Industry Protection," CEPR Discussion Papers 980, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    24. Heyes, Anthony G., 1997. "Environmental Regulation by Private Contest," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 407-428, February.
    25. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. " Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-30, March.
    26. Michael Waldman, 1991. "The Role of Multiple Potential Entrants/Sequential Entry in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 446-453, Autumn.
    27. Peter Burton, 2004. "Hugging Trees: Claiming de Facto Property Rights by Blockading Resource Use," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(2), pages 135-163, February.
    28. Amihai Glazer & Eckhard Janeba, 2004. "Strategic Investment by a Regulated Firm," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 123-132, 03.
    29. A. Michael Spence, 1977. "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 534-544, Autumn.
    30. Boyce, John R, 1998. " Rent-Seeking in Natural Resource Quota Allocations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(3-4), pages 271-94, September.
    31. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 1998. "A two-stage rent-seeking contest for instrument choice and revenue division, applied to environmental policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 281-301, May.
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    Cited by:
    1. Olivier Bos & Béatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction," CESifo Working Paper Series 4345, CESifo Group Munich.

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