Environmental policy choice: Pollution abatement subsidies
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Resource and Energy Economics.
Volume (Year): 20 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505569
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