A model of sequential entry with Leontief costs is studied in which demand is iso-elastic. Some or all firms may hold excess capacity in the perfect equilibrium to the entry game. Firms with a first mover advantage trade off the positioning value of a large investment in capacity, leading to a large market share, against the possible costs of bearing the burden of entry deterrence through holding excess capacity in equilibrium.
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Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
835.
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