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Markets and Regulatory Hold-Up Problems

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Author Info
Gersbach, Hans
Glazer, Amihai

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 37 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 151-164
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:37:y:1999:i:2:p:151-164

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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  2. Zhao, Jinhua, 2000. "Irreversible Abatement Investment Under Cost Uncertainties: Tradable Emissions Permits and Emissions Charges," Staff General Research Papers 1873, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Jinhua Zhao, 2000. "Irreversible Abatement Investment Under Cost Uncertainties: Tradable Emission Permits and Emissions Charges," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 00-wp252, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Larry Karp & Jiangfeng Zhang, 2008. "Taxes Versus Quantities for a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Costs and Asymmetric Information," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series 1064, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ralph Winkler, 2008. "Optimal compliance with emission constraints: dynamic characteristics and the choice of technique," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(4), pages 411-432, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Christophe Deissenberg & Herbert Dawid & Pavel Sevcik, 2004. "Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game," Working Papers 2004.137, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  7. Richard Mash & Dieter Helm & Cameron Hepburn, 2003. "Time Inconsistent Environmental Policy and Optimal Delegation," Economics Series Working Papers 175, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Marie-Laure Breuillé, 2007. "Tradable deficit permits: a way to ensure sub-national fiscal discipline?," EconomiX Working Papers 2007-17, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX. [Downloadable!]
  10. Nelissen, Dagmar & Requate, Till, 2004. "Pollution-Reducing and Resource-Saving Technological Progress," Economics Working Papers 2004,07, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Hans Gersbach & Till Requate, 2000. "Emission Taxes and the Design of Refunding Schemes," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Joerg Breitscheidel & Hans Gersbach, 2005. "Self-Financing Environmental Mechanisms," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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