Government Incentives when Pollution Permits are Durable Goods
AbstractThis paper analyzes the incentive effects of pollution taxes versus pollution permits for a revenue maximizing Government that also pursues environmental objectives. In our model, pollution permits are analyzed as durable goods, and the leasing of pollution permits is seen as an equivalent to a pollution tax. We show that environmental policy based on durable pollution permits can be welfare superior to a pollution tax regime. The intuition is that a monopolistic Government would, in order to maximize its revenues, try to restrict the permit sales below the welfare maximizing level. While a pollution tax or leasing charge allows the Government to credibly commit to a monopoly level of pollution in future periods, a system based on durable permits weakens the monopolistic Government?s ability to credibly restrict future sales. Therefore, a pollution tax regime may be better for the environment and simultaneously increase Government revenues, but social welfare is larger with pollution permits. Hence, a regime where the Government cannot commit to monopoly quantities may be preferable from a welfare economic perspective. This argument in favor of durable permits complements more traditional arguments based on information asymmetries and innovation incentives. --
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics in its series CSLE Discussion Paper Series with number 2001-06.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Postfach 151150, 66041 Saarbrücken
Phone: *49(0)681-302 2132
Fax: *49(0)681-302 3591
Web page: http://www.uni-saarland.de/fak1/fr12/csle/
More information through EDIRC
Emissions Permits; Pollution Tax; Time Inconsistency; Durable Goods;
Other versions of this item:
- Haucap, Justus & Kirstein, Roland, 2003. " Government Incentives When Pollution Permits Are Durable Goods," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 115(1-2), pages 163-83, April.
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- K3 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Till Requate, 1995. "Incentives to adopt new technologies under different pollution-control policies," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 295-317, August.
- Wirl, Franz & Dockner, Engelbert, 1995. "Leviathan governments and carbon taxes: Costs and potential benefits," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 1215-1236, June.
- von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik Morch & Kuhn, Kai-Uwe, 1995. "Coase versus Pacman: Who Eats Whom in the Durable-Goods Monopoly?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 785-812, August.
- Nancy L. Stokey, 1981. "Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 112-128, Spring.
- Bagnoli, Mark & Salant, Stephen W & Swierzbinski, Joseph E, 1989. "Durable-Goods Monopoly with Discrete Demand," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1459-78, December.
- Biglaiser, Gary & Horowitz, John K & Quiggin, John, 1995. "Dynamic Pollution Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 33-44, July.
- Gersbach, Hans & Glazer, Amihai, 1999.
"Markets and Regulatory Hold-Up Problems,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 151-164, March.
- Gersbach, Hans & Glazer, Amihai, 1998. "Markets and regulatory hold-up problems," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt9gf9t35g, University of California Transportation Center.
- Gersbach, Hans & Glazer, Amihai, 1999. "Markets and regulatory hold-up problems," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt76f9604n, University of California Transportation Center.
- Milliman, Scott R. & Prince, Raymond, 1989. "Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 247-265, November.
- Denicolo, Vincenzo, 1999.
"Pollution-Reducing Innovations under Taxes or Permits,"
Oxford Economic Papers,
Oxford University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 184-99, January.
- V. Denicolo, 1997. "Pollution-Reducing Innovations Under Taxes or Permits," Working Papers 281, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996.
"Pollution permits and environmental innovation,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 127-140, October.
- Fredriksson, Per G., 1997. "The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 44-58, May.
- Jung, Chulho & Krutilla, Kerry & Boyd, Roy, 1996. "Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 95-111, January.
- Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-49, April.
- Bulow, Jeremy I, 1982. "Durable-Goods Monopolists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 314-32, April.
- Kirchgassner, Gebhard & Schneider, Friedrich, 2003.
" On the Political Economy of Environmental Policy,"
Public Choice, Springer,
Springer, vol. 115(3-4), pages 369-96, June.
- Haucap, Justus & Kirstein, Roland, 2002. "Warum Staaten Ökosteuern statt Lizenzen einführen, und wann das schlecht für die Wohlfahrt ist," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics 2002-07, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Halkos, George, 2009. "A Differential game approach in the case of a polluting oligopoly," MPRA Paper 23742, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Eva Schliephake, 2013. "Risk Weighted Capital Regulation and Government Debt," FEMM Working Papers 130011, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
- Rajeev Goel, 2006. "Uncertain innovation with uncertain product durability," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(13), pages 829-834.
- Leon Vinokur, 2009. "Environmental Policy under Ambiguity," Working Papers, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance 638, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.