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Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 05-87.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:4570

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Related research

Keywords: Hold-up problems; Environmental regulation; Taxes and subsidies; Selffinancing mechanisms; Emission control;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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1. Joerg Breitscheidel & Hans Gersbach, 2005. "Self-Financing Environmental Mechanisms," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
2. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
3. Requate, Till & Unold, Wolfram, 2003. "Environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology:: Will the true ranking please stand up?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 125-146, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Tornell, Aaron, 1991. "Time Inconsistency of Protectionist Programs," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(3), pages 963-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Hans Gersbach, 2002. "How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 45-56. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-40, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Jung, Chulho & Krutilla, Kerry & Boyd, Roy, 1996. "Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 95-111, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. David J. Salant & Glenn A. Woroch, 1992. "Trigger Price Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 29-51, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Urbiztondo, Santiago, 1994. "Investment without Regulatory Commitment: The Case of Elastic Demand," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 87-96, February.
10. Hal R. Varian, 1994. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed}," Microeconomics 9401003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Varian, H,R., 1991. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed," Papers 10, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    • Varian, Hal R, 1994. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are Well-Informed," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1278-93, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Laffont, J.J. & Tirole, J., 1995. "Pollution Permits and Environmental Innovation," Papers 95.396, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    Other versions:
    • Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Pollution permits and environmental innovation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 127-140, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Staiger, Robert W & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 823-37, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Milliman, Scott R. & Prince, Raymond, 1989. "Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 247-265, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Joskow, Paul L, 1987. "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 168-85, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Kiminori Matsuyama, 1987. "Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game," Discussion Papers 738, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Matsuyama, Kiminori, 1990. "Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 480-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Richard J. Gilbert & David M. Newbery, 1994. "The Dynamic Efficiency of Regulatory Constitutions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(4), pages 538-554, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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