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Permanent versus interim regulations: A game-theoretic analysis

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Malik, Arun S.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ6-4CYH2M7-H8/2/a21a9911d7b93240c02057e8ba9b4545
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 21 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 127-139
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:21:y:1991:i:2:p:127-139

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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  2. Geoffrey Heal & Nori Tarui, 2008. "Technology Diffusion, Abatement Cost, and Transboundary Pollution," Working Papers 2008.96, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Olivier Cadot & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 1995. "Innovation Under the Threat of Stricter Environmental Standards," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-11, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  4. Breitscheidel, Jörg, 2005. "Hold-up Problems with Respect to R&D Investment and Licensing in Environmental Regulation," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-86, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. Hans Gersbach & Till Requate, 2000. "Emission Taxes and the Design of Refunding Schemes," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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