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Abstract

This paper studies whether it is possible to characterize an optimal, time-consistent tariff to protect an infant-industry in the presence of learning effects. A domestic monopolist decides how much to produce, taking into account learning effects induced by its current production, while the governemnt decides on the level of tariff protection. In order to ensure time consistency and characterize the optimal policy i solve the case where learning leads to lower fixed costs..

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 47 (2003)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
Pages: 761-790

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:47:y:2003:i:5:p:761-790

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
• F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
• F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

References

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1. Miravete, Eugenio J, 2001. "Time-Consistent Protection with Learning by Doing," CEPR Discussion Papers 2937, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   
   • Miravete, Eugenio J., 2003. "Time-consistent protection with learning by doing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 761-790, October.
   • Miravete, E.J., 1997. "Time-Consistent Protection With Learning by Doing," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 395.97, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
2. Tornell, Aaron, 1991. "Time Inconsistency of Protectionist Programs," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(3), pages 963-74, August.
3. Lockwood, Ben, 1996. "Uniqueness of Markov-perfect equilibrium in infinite-time affine-quadratic differential games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 751-765, May.
4. Miyagiwa, K. & Ohno, Y., 1993. "Closing the Technology Gap Under Protection," Working Papers 93-09, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
   
   • Miyagiwa, Kaz & Ohno, Yuka, 1995. "Closing the Technology Gap under Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 755-70, September.
   • Miyagiwa, K. & Ohno, Y., 1993. "Closing the Technology Gap Under Protection," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 93-09, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
5. Miyagiwa, Kaz & Ohno, Yuka, 1999. "Credibility of Protection and Incentives to Innovate," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 143-63, February.
6. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1991. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," CEPR Discussion Papers 519, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   
   • Obstfeld, Maurice, 1997. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt712610vq, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
   • Maurice Obstfeld, 1989. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," NBER Working Papers 2869, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   • Maurice Obstfeld and ., 1997. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C97-085, University of California at Berkeley.
7. Reynolds, Stanley S, 1987. "Capacity Investment, Preemption and Commitment in an Infinite Horizon Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(1), pages 69-88, February.
8. Fershtman, Chaim & Kamien, Morton I, 1987. "Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1151-64, September.
9. Driskill, Robert A. & McCafferty, Stephen, 1989. "Dynamic duopoly with adjustment costs: A differential game approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 324-338, December.
10. Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1997. "Time Consistent Taxation by a Government with Redistributive Goals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 282-305, February.
11. Cohen, Daniel & Michel, Philippe, 1988. "How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 263-74, April.
12. Reynolds, Stanley S., 1991. "Dynamic oligopoly with capacity adjustment costs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 491-514, July.
13. Lockwood, Ben & Philippopoulos, Apostolis, 1994. "Insider Power, Unemployment Dynamics and Multiple Inflation Equilibria," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 61(241), pages 59-77, February.
14. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1982. "A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 671-88, May.
15. Matsuyama, Kiminori, 1990. "Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 480-92, June.
    
    • Kiminori Matsuyama, 1987. "Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game," Discussion Papers 738, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
16. Staiger, Robert W & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 823-37, December.
17. Leahy, Dermot & Neary, J Peter, 1999. "Learning by Doing, Precommitment and Infant-Industry Promotion," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 447-74, April.
18. Dinopoulos, Elias & Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1995. "Optimal industrial targeting with unknown learning-by-doing," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 275-295, May.
19. Gruenspecht, Howard K., 1988. "Dumping and dynamic competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 225-248, November.

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Citations

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Cited by:

1. Jun, Byoung & Vives, Xavier, 2001. "Incentives in Dynamic Duopoly," CEPR Discussion Papers 2899, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
2. Miravete, E.J., 1997. "Time-Consistent Protection With Learning by Doing," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 395.97, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
   
   • Miravete, Eugenio J., 2003. "Time-consistent protection with learning by doing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 761-790, October.
   • Miravete, Eugenio J, 2001. "Time-Consistent Protection with Learning by Doing," CEPR Discussion Papers 2937, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
3. Saure, Philip, 2007. "Revisiting the infant industry argument," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 104-117, September.
4. Steffen Jørgensen & Georges Zaccour, 2007. "Developments in differential game theory and numerical methods: economic and management applications," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 159-181, April.
5. Bläsi, Albrecht & Requate, Till, 2005. "Learning-by-Doing with Spillovers in Competitive Industries, Free Entry, and Regulatory Policy," Economics Working Papers 2005,09, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
6. Greetje Everaert, 2003. "Technology Adoption under Price Undertakings," LICOS Discussion Papers 13703, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
7. G. Calzolari & L. Lambertini, 2001. "Export Restraints in a Model of Trade with Capital Accumulation," Working Papers 420, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
   
   • Calzolari, Giacomo & Lambertini, Luca, 2007. "Export restraints in a model of trade with capital accumulation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 3822-3842, December.
8. Vladimir Petkov, 2007. "Infant Firm Subsidization in Industries with Dynamic Structure," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 73-93, June.
9. Siebert, Ralph Bernd, 2010. "Learning-by-Doing and Cannibalization Effects at Multi-Vintage Firms: Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry," MPRA Paper 24008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
10. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 2007. "An investment contest to influence environmental policy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 300-324, November.
11. Delia Ionaºcu & Kresimir Zigic, 2005. "Strategic Tariff Protection, Market Conduct, and Government Commitment Levels in Developing Economies," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp249, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.

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