Uniqueness of Markov-perfect equilibrium in infinite-time affine-quadratic differential games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
Volume (Year): 20 (1996)
Issue (Month): 5 (May)
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