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Developments in differential game theory and numerical methods: economic and management applications

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  • Steffen Jørgensen
  • Georges Zaccour

    ()

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10287-006-0032-x
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Computational Management Science.

Volume (Year): 4 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 159-181

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Handle: RePEc:spr:comgts:v:4:y:2007:i:2:p:159-181

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=111894

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Related research

Keywords: Differential game theory; Economics; Management; Numerical methods;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Didier Laussel & Maxime de Montmarin & Ngo Van Long, 2004. "Dynamic Duopoly with Congestion Effects," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-09, CIRANO.
  2. Ngo Van Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2004. "Insecure Property Rights and Growth: The Roles of Appropriation Costs, Wealth Effects, and Heterogeneity," CESifo Working Paper Series 1253, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Rubio, Santiago J. & Escriche, Luisa, 2001. "Strategic pigouvian taxation, stock externalities and polluting non-renewable resources," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 297-313, February.
  4. Rubio, Santiago J. & Casino, Begona, 2002. "A note on cooperative versus non-cooperative strategies in international pollution control," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 251-261, June.
  5. Ramla Jarrar & Guiomar Martín-Herrán & Georges Zaccour, 2004. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium Advertising Strategies of Lanchester Duopoly Model: A Technical Note," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(7), pages 995-1000, July.
  6. G. Calzolari & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Tariffs vs Quotas in a Model of Trade with Capital Accumulation," Working Papers 392, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  7. Frank M. Bass & Anand Krishnamoorthy & Ashutosh Prasad & Suresh P. Sethi, 2005. "Generic and Brand Advertising Strategies in a Dynamic Duopoly," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(4), pages 556-568, February.
  8. Miravete, Eugenio J., 2003. "Time-consistent protection with learning by doing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 761-790, October.
  9. Engwerda, J.C. & Aarle, B. van & Plasmans, J.E.J., 2002. "Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-88304, Tilburg University.
  10. Francisco Cabo & Guiomar Martín-Herrán, 2006. "North–South transfers vs biodiversity conservation: a trade differential game," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 249-278, June.
  11. Murray C. Kemp & Ngo Van Long & Koji Shimomura, 2000. "A Differential Game Model of Tariff War," Discussion Paper Series 111, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  12. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2002. "Private and Social Incentives Towards Investment in Product Differentiation," Working Papers 431, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  13. Michèle Breton & Ramla Jarrar & Georges Zaccour, 2006. "A Note on Feedback Sequential Equilibria in a Lanchester Model with Empirical Application," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(5), pages 804-811, May.
  14. Steffen Jørgensen & Guiomar Martín-Herrán & Georges Zaccour, 2005. "Sustainability Of Cooperation Overtime In Linear-Quadratic Differential Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(04), pages 395-406.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Martín-Herrán, Guiomar & Sigué, Simon Pierre & Zaccour, Georges, 2011. "Strategic interactions in traditional franchise systems: Are franchisors always better off?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 213(3), pages 526-537, September.
  2. Martín-Herrán, Guiomar & Taboubi, Sihem & Zaccour, Georges, 2012. "Dual role of price and myopia in a marketing channel," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 219(2), pages 284-295.
  3. Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera, 2012. "On feedback nash equilibrium and cooperation in the neoclassical growth model," EconoQuantum, Revista de Economia y Negocios, Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas, Departamento de Metodos Cuantitativos y Maestria en Economia., vol. 9(2), pages 29-43, Julio-Dic.

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