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Private provision of public good and immiserizing growth

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  • Debasis Mondal

Abstract

This paper develops a simple R&D driven endogenous growth model with a public good financed by private contributions. I show that a larger endowment of population or resources can be immiserizing for the economy as a whole. With a larger population, the economy grows at a higher rate but per-capita income from asset holdings falls unambiguously. Since people voluntarily contribute a part of their instantaneous income toward the public good, reduced asset income may lead to lower level of provision of the public good. This brings in the possibility of immiserizing growth where higher rate of growth is associated with lower level of welfare. I also show that the socially optimum level of public good provision may well fall below the equilibrium level and that the problem of underprovision of the public good need not be aggravated in larger economies. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

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  • Debasis Mondal, 2015. "Private provision of public good and immiserizing growth," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 29-49, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:1:p:29-49
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0842-7
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    Cited by:

    1. Tamai, Toshiki, 2018. "Dynamic provision of public goods under uncertainty," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 409-415.
    2. Debasis Mondal & Manash Ranjan Gupta, 2022. "Private provision of public goods: a general equilibrium analysis," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 285-300, December.

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