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The theory of contests : a survey

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  • Luis C. Corchon

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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we075126.

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Date of creation: Apr 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we075126

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  1. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2007. "Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 101-124, September.
  2. Che,Y.K. & Gale,I., 1998. "Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 6, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  3. Konrad, Kai A, 2000. "Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 155-65, April.
  4. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1999. " Legal Expenditure as a Rent-Seeking Game," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 100(3-4), pages 271-88, September.
  5. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1990. "The Allocation of Talent: Implicationsfor Growth," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State 65, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  6. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
  7. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Governance and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 505-518, April.
  9. Gradstein, Mark, 2002. "Governance and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3270, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June.
  11. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
  12. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
  13. Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. " Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
  14. Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 455-470, April.
  15. Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 271-303, 09.
  16. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1999. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim 99-75, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  17. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  18. Baland, Jean-Marie & Francois, Patrick, 2000. "Rent-seeking and resource booms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 527-542, April.
  19. Hillman, Arye L & Katz, Eliakim, 1984. "Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 104-10, March.
  20. Fang, Hanming, 2002. " Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Models of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 112(3-4), pages 351-71, September.
  21. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002. "Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies," Keele Economics Research Papers, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University KERP 2002/22, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
  22. Nugent, Jeffrey B. & Sanchez, Nicolas, 1989. "The efficiency of the mesta: A parable," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 261-284, July.
  23. Jung, Chulho & Krutilla, Kerry & Kip Viscusi, W. & Boyd, Roy, 1995. "The coase theorem in rent-seeking society," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 259-268, September.
  24. Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 201-204.
  25. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-27, August.
  26. Esteban, J. & Ray, D., 1999. "Collective Action and Group Size Paradox," Papers, El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza 23, El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza.
  27. Corchón, Luis C. & Dahm, Matthias, 2008. "Foundations for contest success functions," Working Papers, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics 2072/9493, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  28. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Okuguchi, Koji, 1997. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 135-140, January.
  29. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August.
  30. Nti, Kofi O., 1998. "Effort and performance in group contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 769-781, November.
  31. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2004. "On the Social Efficiency of Conflict," ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh 97, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  32. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September.
  33. Perez-Castrillo, J David & Verdier, Thierry, 1992. " A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 335-50, April.
  34. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 803-832, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Jia, Hao & Skaperdas, Stergios & Vaidya, Samarth, 2013. "Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 211-222.
  2. Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Fuzzy Price-Quality Ratio Procurement under Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York 12/26, Department of Economics, University of York.
  3. Jörg Franke & Tahir Öztürk, 2009. "Conflict Networks," Ruhr Economic Papers, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen 0116, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  4. Wagener, Andreas & Kolmar, Martin, 2011. "Group Identities in Conflicts," Annual Conference 2011 (Frankfurt, Main): The Order of the World Economy - Lessons from the Crisis, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association 48694, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  5. Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "Probabilistic Procurement Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 4320, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2014. "Settlement and Trial: Selected Analyses of the Bargaining Environment," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics 14-00006, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  7. Sina Risse, 2011. "Two-stage group rent-seeking with negatively interdependent preferences," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 259-276, June.
  8. Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "All-pay-all Aspects of Political Decision Making," CESifo Working Paper Series 4330, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Christoffel Grechenig & Martin Kolmar, 2011. "The State’s Enforcement Monopoly and the Private Protection of Property," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011_24, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  10. Pelosse, Yohan, 2011. "Inter and intra-group conflicts as a foundation for contest success functions," MPRA Paper 31468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Magnus Hoffmann & Martin Kolmar, 2013. "Distributional Preferences in Probabilistic and Share Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 4184, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Boudreau, James W. & Shunda, Nicholas, 2010. "On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests," MPRA Paper 24640, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Shumei Hirai, 2012. "Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Contests with Endogenous Prizes," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 2744-2751.
  14. Rodney Fort & Jason Winfree, 2009. "Sports Really are Different: The Contest Success Function and the Supply of Talent," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 69-80, February.

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