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Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics José Alcalde ()
Matthias Dahm ()
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design .
Volume (Year): 11 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 101-124
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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:101-124Contact details of provider: Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm
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Keywords: Rent-seeking ; (Non-)deterministic contest ; Contest success function ; All-pay auction ; Rent dissipation ; Exclusion principle ; Preemption effect ; Cap ; Campaign contributions ; C72 ; D72 ; D44 ; Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992.
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"Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions ,"
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Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996.
"The all-pay auction with complete information (*) ,"
Economic Theory ,
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Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & Vries, Casper de, 1995.
"The All-pay Auction with Complete Information ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G., 1995.
"The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information ,"
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311.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992.
"The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information ,"
Papers
8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991.
"The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information ,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1007, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Varies, C.G., 1990.
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Perez-Castrillo, J David & Verdier, Thierry, 1992.
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Konrad, Kai A., 2000.
"Spatial contests ,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2007.
"All-Pay Auction Equilibria In Contests ,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
2007-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
[Downloadable!]
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Luis Corchón, 2007.
"The theory of contests: a survey ,"
Review of Economic Design ,
Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 69-100, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2007.
"All-Pay Auction Equilibria In Contests ,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
2007-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
[Downloadable!]
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