On the social efficiency of conflict
AbstractIn sharp contrast with the economic literature on conflict, this paper shows that confrontation may be efficiency enhancing. Conditions are derived under which a contest over the exclusive control of a resource Pareto dominates open access. When the population size is big enough or production exhibits strong decreasing returns to scale, agents unanimously prefer to engage in conflict.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 90 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992.
"Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September.
- Skaperdas, S., 1991. "Cooperation, Conflict And Power In The Absence Of Property Rights," Papers 90-91-06a, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996.
"Contest Success Functions,"
Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
- Muthoo, Abhinay, 2004.
"A model of the origins of basic property rights,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 288-312, November.
- Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 1983. "On Commons and Tragedies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 787-92, September.
- Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
- Bush, Winston C. & Mayer, Lawrence S., 1974. "Some implications of anarchy for the distribution of property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 401-412, August.
- Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
- Neary, Hugh M, 1997. "Equilibrium Structure in an Economic Model of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 480-94, July.
- Janus, Thorsten, 2012. "Natural resource extraction and civil conflict," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 24-31.
- Carmen Beviá & Luis C. Corchón, 2008.
"Peace Agreements Without Commitment,"
340, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Luis Corchón, 2007.
"The theory of contests: a survey,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 69-100, September.
- Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2007.
"Endogenous Coalition Formation in Contests,"
ESE Discussion Papers
158, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Markwardt, Gunther & Farzanegan, Mohammad & Leßmann, Christian, 2013.
"Natural-resource rents and internal conflicts - Can decentralization lift the curse?,"
Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order
79940, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Mohammad Reza Farzanegan & Christian Lessmann & Gunther Markwardt, 2013. "Natural-Resource Rents and Internal Conflicts - Can Decentralization Lift the Curse?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4180, CESifo Group Munich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.